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ABSTRACT
An abstract of the thesis of Marta R. Colburn for the Master

of Science in Political Science presented February 8, 1995,
and accepted by the thesis committee and the department.
Title:

Liberalism, Community, and the Context of Choice

Issues of community have become an important focus in
the field of political theory in North America.

Critics of

liberalism, the dominant American theoretical tradition,
have charged that liberal theorists have misconceived the
nature of community at the ontological and societal level.
Some critics see a relationship between the failure of
liberal theorists to adequately address community and
certain social pathologies facing the American liberal
polity.
This thesis seeks to address the following questions:
How have liberal theorists typically dealt with the issue of
community?

What are the major criticisms related to issues

of community currently being leveled at liberalism?

Are

there theorists who have noted liberalism's weaknesses with
regard to community and who have retooled the liberal
enterprise?

Finally, assuming a liberal response, which of

these if any are the most compelling?
In response to the last question, the work of two
liberal theorists, Will Kymlicka and William Galston, are

analyzed for their responses to criticisms of liberalism
issuing from the communitarian school.

In the findings of

this thesis, the liberal response found in Kymlicka's
Liberalism, Community, and Culture presents the most
powerful reply to these critiques.

Kymlicka uses the

challenge of minority rights to liberal conceptions of
justice to argue that liberal traditions can be drawn upon
for a coherent recognition of culture as an essential right
of the individual.

Kymlicka bases his argument for

expanding liberal understandings of minority rights on
liberalism's commitment to equality of circumstances;
viewing culture as a potential source of inequality which
the dominant culture takes for granted, but which minority
cultures must struggle to maintain.
By addressing the questions above I hope to contribute
to the debate about liberalism and community and sharpen the
insights of liberal political theory.

By incorporating the

insights of Kymlicka into liberal theory I believe that
liberalism can better address public policy challenges in
contemporary American society, many of which are closely
tied to concerns of community.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
... man is only what he is made to be by his
external circumstances; he is necessarily elevated
by his equals; he contracts from them his habits
and his wants; his ideas are no longer his own; he
enjoys, from the enviable prerogative of his
species, a capacity of developing his
understanding by the power of imitation, and the
influence of society. 1
Jean-Marc-Gaspard Itard
The Wild Boy of Aveyron

The concept of community is one which has generated
considerable discussion and debate over the millennium.

The

ideas articulated about integral aspects of community such
as laws and mores have ranged from the secular to the divine
and many shades in between.

This debate continues today not

only among contemporary political theorists but also in less
academic circles; the "meaning" of community, the "crisis"
in community, the "break down" of community, have been
raised in the public arena of media and politics by diverse
voices.

In contemporary political and legal spheres,

Jean-Marc-Gaspard Itard, "The Wild Boy of
Aveyron", in Wolf Children and the Problem of
Human Nature, by Lucien Malson, (New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1972), p. 91. Jean Itard was a
physician, and teacher, at the National Institute
for the Deaf and Dumb in Paris who chronicled his
treatment of Victor, the "Wolf-Boy of Aveyron",
from his capture in 1799. The quotation is taken
form the 1802 English translation of his first
report on Victor in 1801.
1

2

theorists from a variety of perspectives have addressed
issues relating to community.

To many it seems a critical

issue generating heated debate amongst the protagonists.
On the issue of community, liberalism, as the dominant
political theory in American society, is coming under attack
from many quarters.

There are those that criticize

liberalism for its deleterious impact on community stemming
from it secular nature, and there are those who criticize it
for destroying community with its self-serving capitalist
Protestant ethic.

It can be stated that the leading

political theory in a society will come under attack in
times of crisis, simply due to its dominant position and the
propensity to seek simple answers to complex problems.

This

caveat aside, liberalism may have a particular Achilles heel
when it comes to issues of community.
Widely held concerns for collective aspects of society
are challenging the foundations of the atomistic nature of
life in contemporary America.

Liberal theorists, whatever

their role in contributing to this situation, are responding
to the challenge.

Traditionally, liberal theorists have not

struggled with the topic of community.

They have focused

more of their attention on the individual and their
relationship with the state.

However, the recent onslaught

against liberalism in political theory regarding its effect
on communal association has led a number of liberal
theorists down some promising avenues.

3

This thesis will attempt to sift through the liberal
vocabulary and a number of leading liberal theorists with
regard to issues of community.

Further it will examine

criticisms of liberal theory and theorists based in the
American polity and summarize the work of two leading
liberal theorists whose work is of direct relevance to
issues of community.

The questions addressed in this thesis

are related to the challenge of community to liberalism and
how this challenge has expanded the liberal project.

I

shall examine the treatment of community and the context of
choice in the writings of a number of contemporary
philosophers from the liberal camp and those critical of
liberalism.

The specific questions focused on through the

course of this study are: How have liberal theorists
typically dealt with the issue of community?

What are the

salient criticisms related to issues of community currently
being leveled at liberalism? Are there theorists who have
noted liberalism's weaknesses with regard to community and
who have retooled the liberal enterprise?

Finally, which of

these liberal responses are the most compelling?.

THE VOCABULARY

Liberalism
When one examines the history of liberalism one

4

witnesses a considerable diversity of issues that it has
addressed as i t has responded to challenges faced by liberal
and non-liberal communities.
succinctly defined.

Liberalism is not easily and

This thesis will limit itself to

discussing liberal theory, not with meanings and
misunderstanding associated with the term liberal used as an
adjective.

Richard Flathman, a contemporary leading liberal

theorist, summarizes some of the problems in defining
liberalism.
It is identified by a series of political causes
espoused by liberals over the centuries, by a
variety of claims about the working of society and
the economy, and by a cluster of ideas concerning
the fundamental principles of political morality.
It is probably true to say that no political
cause, no one vision of society nor any political
principle has commanded the respect of liberals in
any given generation, let alone through the
centuries. 2
Disciples as well as critics of liberalism recognize
that liberalism is not a closely integrated doctrine.
Richard Flathman observes that liberalism's "proponents have
held to a considerable and frequently changing variety of
views and its historians and critics have regularly
disagreed concerning its main ideas and tendencies.

113

Flathman explains that the breadth of doctrine found under

2

Freedom,

As quoted by Joseph Raz, The Morality of
(Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1986),

p. 1.

Richard E. Flathman, Towards a Liberalism,
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press,
1989)' p. 2.
3

5

liberalism's shadow is partially the result of liberal
"suspicion of systematic, programmatic, certainly dogmatic
theorizing. " 4
I shall rely on Bruce Ackerman's definition of the
tenets of liberalism, as related by Flathman in his book

Towards a Liberalism, to introduce liberal terminology, and
its basic view of society as regarding the individual's role
in communal interactions.
(1) Human beings are purposive, goal-seeking
creatures whose actions and patterns of action
cannot be understood apart from their conceptions
of the good. (2) Conceptions of the good and goals
of action are irreducibly plural. There are no
criteria of good that exclude the possibility of
cogent disputation, and application of the
available criteria frequently leads to conflicting
judgements and conclusions. (3) There is a
scarcity of at least some of the goods that human
beings seek and of the resources necessary to
effective pursuit of those goods.
(4) Hence there
is certain to be disagreement and competition and
very likely to be conflict among human beings. (5)
Disagreement, competition, and conflict neither
can nor should be eliminated, but conflict must be
contained within nondestructive limits. (6) The
primary objective of politics is to promote an
ordering of human interaction which allows each
person the greatest possible freedom to pursue
goals compatible with effective constraints on
destructive conflict. 5
Since liberalism has worn many faces over the centuries,
this particular definition of the foundations of liberal
philosophy is by no means exhaustive of liberalism or

4

Ibid.

5

Ibid, p. 49-50.

6

exclusive to it 6 •

Community and the Context of Choice
This discourse on liberalism, community and the context
of choice will not propose a version of the ideal or "real"
community.

I shall define community as the sharing of

interactions, or affiliations, or conceptions of the good
not wholly on a voluntary and rational basis.

This minimal

definition aims to avoid a number of methodological and
ontological pitfalls commonly encountered when one is
cornbatting the atomistic tendencies of liberalism.
In elaboration of this basic idea, community contains
the essential characteristic as the context within which
normative life-decisions are made.

A community may consist

of an indigenous minority culture navigating within a
dominant and possibly hostile culture, or it may be the
influences and networks which shape the decisions of a
white, middle-class truck driver.

However, community is

more than just the circle one chooses to associate with.

It

also includes factors one may have little influence upon,
such as aspects of popular culture (e.g. television) and
political realities (e.g. the legal system).

I recognize

the myriad of communities which could provide an environment
conducive to the flourishing of a liberal polity and
sustaining to a liberal theory of justice.
6

Ibid, p. 50.

7

In the following passage Will Kymlicka, one of the
liberal theorists

I

shall focus on in this thesis,

articulates an understanding of community as the context of
choice using the vocabulary of liberalism:
So we have two preconditions for the fulfillment
of our essential interests in leading a life that
is good. One is that we lead our life from the
inside, in accordance with our beliefs about what
gives value to life; the other is that we be free
to question those beliefs, to examine them in
light of whatever information and examples and
arguments our culture can provide. Individuals
must therefore have the resources and liberties
needed to live their lives in accordance with
their beliefs about value, without being
imprisoned or penalized for unorthodox religious
or sexual practices etc. Hence the traditional
liberal concern for civil and personal liberties.
And individuals must have the cultural conditions
conducive to acquiring an awareness of different
views about the good life, and to acquiring an
ability to intelligently examine and re-examine
these views. Hence the equally traditional
liberal concern for education, freedom of
expression, freedom of the press, artistic
freedom, etc. These liberties enable us to judge
what is valuable in life in the only way we can
judge such things--i.e. by exploring different
aspects of our collective cultural heritage. 7
The idea of cultural community is important to this
definition of the context of choice.

Kymlicka makes a

distinction between political and cultural communities
useful to this thesis.

They are respectively the structures

of a modern state, with a government and shared legal
system8 , and the cultural structure in a community as the
7

Culture,

Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and
(Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1991), p.

12-13.
8

Ibid, p. 135.

8

context of choice for life-plans allowing us to judge for
ourselves the value of our choices. 9

While this

distinction is essential, there are many points where
cultural and political communities are deeply intertwined
and difficult to separate for purposes of analysis.
Features of mass culture in American society promote certain
values which are often inseparable from political life.

In

modernity, government intervention and regulation, or lack
thereof, deeply affects how we live our lives and the
choices we make about the good.
Kymlicka aptly describes the role of culture in the
choice process in the following:
Different ways of life are not simply different
patterns of physical movements. The physical
movements only have meaning to us because they are
identified as having significance by our culture,
because they fit into some pattern of activities
which is culturally recognized as a way of leading
one's life. We learn about these patterns of
activity through their presence in stories we've
heard about the lives, real or imaginary, of
others. They become potential models, and define
potential roles, that we can adopt as our own.
From childhood on, we become aware both that we
are already participants in certain forms of life
(familial, religious, sexual, educational, etc.),
and that there are other ways of life which of fer
alternative models and roles that we may, in time,
come to endorse. We decide how to lead our lives
by situating ourselves in these cultural
narratives, by adopting roles that have struck us
as worthwhile ones, as ones worth living (which
may, of course, include the roles we were brought
Particular cultural communities are not
frozen in time, but continue "to exist even when
its members are free to modify the character of
the culture, should they find its traditional ways
of life no longer worth while." (Ibid, p. 166-7.)
9

9

up to occupy) . 10
The development of a number of capacities are
undeniably tied to the community.

For example the capacity

for moral judgment is tied in numerous ways to the moral
life of a community.

Charles Larmore identifies the moral

scheme of the community as being the foremost determinant in
the development of moral judgment 11 •

"[N]o one can acquire

judgment by being imparted some kind of formal doctrine.

It

can be learned only through practice, through being trained
in the performance of right actions .... Because training and
experience play such a vital role in the acquisition of
judgment, the development of moral character depends upon
the moral life of the community.

1112

However, this point

does not assert that the community is the only factor worthy
of consideration.
This understanding of community aims to avoid viewing
community as the only factor entering the choice process.
This would be an error similar to those who maintain that
the choice process is self-contained in the individual-biologically, genetically, morally, or intellectually
10

Ibid, p. 165.

11

Larmore defines moral judgment as aiming
"at the appropriate application of moral rules to
particular circumstances insofar as their
application requires choosing among morally
different alternatives." Charles E. Larmore,
Patterns of Moral Complexity (Columbia University,
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 7.
12

Ibid, p. 15.

10

generated.

It merely attempts to bring community back into

the dialogue of understanding the choice process, where it
is often excluded.

The Choices
The choices of concern in this thesis are choices which
have normative significance.

The range of choices with

normative significance will vary within one culture, and
between cultures and generations: one culture may confer
moral consequences on the eating of beef, while another
culture may view it as morally neutral.

Every culture has a

range of understandings about what is meaningful, what is
harmful, how to live the "good" life; in other words
different cultures may generate various "conceptions of the·
good".

A distinguishing characteristic of liberalism is its

commitment to allow a diversity of conceptions of the good
to flourish.
Richard Flathman explains the notion "conceptions of
the good" as the voluntary forming and pursuing of desires
and interests, ends and purposes. 13

A conception of the

good may draw on one or more moral systems to provide a
framework for individual choice.

A moral system is a

pattern of beliefs and interactions which give meaning to
individual action through reference to a larger narrative of
human life; individual moral choice makes sense only by
13

Flathman, 1989, p. 8.

11
relating it to broader understandings of the good.
Charles Taylor in his book Sources of the Self: The
Making of the Modern Identity writes that moral meaning is

given to individual action by people relating "their story
to a greater pattern of history, as the realization of a
good, whether it be the traditional Heilsgeschicte of
Christianity, or that of the progress of mankind, or the
coming Revolution, or the building of a peaceful world, or
the retrieval or continuance of our national culture .... The
secret of their strength is their capacity to confer meaning
and substance on people's lives.

1114

One could say that

morality provides a framework for understanding the larger
picture of humanity and guidelines for living in harmony
within that structure.
Alasdair Macintyre in his influential book After
Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory poetically describes the

narrative of a human life.
Man is in his actions and practice, as well as in
his fictions, essentially a story-telling animal.
He is not essentially, but becomes through his
history, a teller of stories that aspire to
truth ... It is through hearing stories about wicked
stepmother, lost children, good but misguided
kings, wolves that suckle twin boys, youngest sons
who receive no inheritance but must make their own
way in the world and the eldest sons who waste
their inheritance on riotous living and go into
exile to live with swine, that children learn or
mislearn both what a child and what a parent is,
14
Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The
Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge

Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1989), p.
97.

12
what the cast of characters may be in the drama
into which they have been born and what the ways
of the world are. Deprive children of stories and
you leave them unscripted, anxious stutterers in
their actions as in their words. 15
Taylor elaborates on Macintyre's words with the
observation that moral sources also empower and that the
business of articulating the good exposes our narratives.
"To come closer to them, to have a clearer view of them, to
come to grasp what they involve, is for those who recognize
them to be moved to love or respect them, and through this
love/respect to be better enabled to live up to them.

And

articulation can bring them closer. " 16
The choices the inhabitants of a particular culture
make which have moral significance within the framework of
that culture are the choices which relate to this thesis and
the context of the community.

THE PLAN FORWARD

This thesis struggles with issues of community in the
realm of political theory because of a concern for the
challenges facing American society.

I am not alone in this

Alasdair, Macintyre, After Virtue: A
Study in Moral Theory, (Notre Dame, Indiana:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 216.
15

16

Taylor, 1989, p. 96.

13
concern.

Theorists from a variety of perspectives have

identified critical issues in the American polity which loom
on the horizon. This crisis is aptly summarized by William
Galston who states that his underlying motivation for his
book Liberal Purposes was "evoked not so much by theoretical
puzzles as by civic experiences: of rising rates of crime,
drug abuse, and family breakdown; of the near collapse of
effective public education; of greed and shortsightedness
run amok in public and private affairs; of a steady decline
in public awareness and an equally steady rise in political
cynicism; and of what I can only regard as the relentless
tribalization and barbarization of American life. " 17
I do not believe that the crises Galston lists can be
blamed on the theorist.

Nevertheless, in order to solve the

plethora of the problems in the contemporary world
tremendous efforts are required, that include the talents of
theorists.

This thesis has taken liberalism as a starting

point due to its central position within contemporary
political theory and my own attraction to its powerful
arguments and concern with justice.
I believe that research into issues of community will
prove a fruitful study because there are at least three
relevant problems identified nagging at the heels of

William Galston, Liberal Purposes:
Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal
State, (Cambridge Mass: Cambridge University
Press, 1991), p. 6.
17

14

contemporary theory.

First, fragmentation and atomism in

American life have been accurately identified as
problematic, and many associate liberalism with these
phenomena 18 •

·

Second, liberalism as the dominant political

ideology in American society needs to confront critical
issues of community within the realm of theory.

Third,

liberalism in its traditional articulations is particularly
vulnerable to criticisms with regard to issues of community.
By addressing the questions outlined in this introduction I
hope to contribute to the debate about liberalism, community
and the context of choice and sharpen the insights of
liberal political theory.
The second chapter of this work will examine the
presuppositions of liberalism, from the foundationalist and
deontological cast, focusing on John Rawls' Theory of

Justice and drawing on other liberal theorists for
substantiation.

Chapter three will draw on the work of

critics of liberalism particularly from the communitarian
camp responding to a number of liberal ontological and
social presuppositions: Alasdair Macintyre, Charles Taylor,
Benjamin Barber, and others.

18

The fourth chapter examines

Taylor notes that atomism, which is
evident in the social contract theories of
Grotius, Pufendorf, Locke and others.
For the
first time these theories contain the concept of a
contract of association.
"But what cannot now be
taken for granted anymore is a community with
decisional power over its members.
People start
off as political atoms." Taylor, 1989, p. 193.

15

the recent work of Will Kymlicka and William Galston19 ,
both of whom respond to criticisms of liberalism,
particularly from the communitarian attack, by using
examples drawn from real life policy considerations in the
liberal polity.

The final chapter will compare the work of

Kymlicka and Galston and assess how effective the liberal
response has been in def ending liberal theory from the
communitarian onslaught.

19

Liberalism, Community, and Culture and
Liberal Purposes respectively.

16

CHAPTER II
LIBERALS AND THE CONTEXT OF CHOICE
The likings and dislikings of society, or of some
powerful portion of it, are thus the main thing
which has practically determined the rules laid
down for general observance, under the penalties
of law or opinion.
John Stuart Mill
On Liberty2°
Within the historical legacy of liberalism I shall
focus my discussion on that portion of the contemporary
interpretive debate in North America which pertains to the
relationship between the individual and the community.

The·

more common approach to liberalism is to examine the
relationship between the individual and the state 21 , yet
there is much in the broad vocabulary of liberalism which is
relevant to a discussion of community and the context of

John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ed.
Alburey Castell (Arlington Heights, Illinois:
Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1947), p. 7.
20

21

Thomas A. Spragens discusses four
liberal versions of the relationship between the
liberal state and society and culture and the
individual, i.e. public and private realms: the
neutralist, contractualist, traditionalist, and
radical conceptions. Thomas A. Spragens,
"Reconstructing Liberal Theory: Reason and Liberal
Culture," in Liberals on Liberalism, Alfonso J.
Damico, ed., (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman &
Littlefield, 1986) p. 38.

17

choice.
This chapter will focus on the presuppositions of
liberalism, many of which are shared by the community of
contemporary theorists.

This chapter will establish the

liberal vocabulary which will provide an anchor for
criticisms and a foundation upon which to build.

John

Rawls' A Theory of Justice will be an essential reference
point in this discussion of liberalism due to its dominant
position in contemporary political thought.
The liberal terms I will focus on are those of an
ontological nature and a number of disparate features of the
liberal state and society as they relate to community and
the context of choice.

Ackerman's initial definition

introduced many of the presuppositions about to be
discussed.

ONTOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

There are a number of human capacities presupposed by
liberal philosophy which relate to this thesis.

Ontological

claims about the individual are entwined with the nature of
society and the individual's relationship to it.

Although

18

many liberals are committed to a deontological 22 philosophy
they also share the presupposition of much of the Western
philosophical tradition which attributes the closely related
capacities of free will and rationality to humans.

Agency and Rationality
It is clear that a human ontology which includes a
conception of free will and moral agency pre-dates modern
times.

An ancient account of free will is found in the

biblical culpability of Adam and Eve 23 •

In the Judeo-

Christian heritage free will is one of the qualifying
features of human beings and rationality is the basis of
choice and moral responsibility.

The concept of free will

is predicated on human rationality.

Moreover, Western

theological discussions of free will are incomplete without
reference to a creator.
The "flip side" of free will is of course moral

As defined by Rawls: "a deontological
theory, one that either does not specify the good
independently from the right, or does not
interpret the right as maximizing the good.
(It
should be noted that deontological theories are
defined as non-teleological ones, not as views
that characterize the rightness of institutions
and acts independently from their consequences.)"
Rawls, 1971, p. 30.
22

"In the Hebrew-Christian moral traditions,
a moral agent is held answerable not only for what
he voluntarily does but also for what he intends."
Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1977), p. 122.
23

19
responsibility, and categories of moral culpability are tied
to communal interpretations of rational potentials and

limitations.

Individuals have often been judged and

punished under common morality and legal systems according
to an individual's culturally defined rational ability: subrational (blacks, in a slave economy), pre-rational {minors
or idiots) , or irrational (women) 24 •
Certainly, there are alternative understandings of
human choice and culpability which emphasize circumstances,
fate, or destiny, and diminish the role of human agency.
However, in the Western monotheistic tradition the emphasis
has been on free will and individual responsibility for our
actions, thoughts, and choices.

Alan Donagan in his book

The Theory of Morality notes that the connection between
rationality and voluntary action is integral to the
Christian-Hebrew tradition, as articulated by Aquinas.
"Whatever a human being does as an agent, he does as a
rational creature .... and that every operatio rationalis is a
voluntarium, or voluntary act. " 25
Western secular philosophical traditions have also
based free will claims on human rationality.

In the Post-

For example, denial of property control
and exclusion from in western legal systems, for
purposes of giving witness and serving jury duty,
were often justified on the basis of women's
irrationality, emotional nature, and propensity to
hysteria.
24

25

Ibid, p. 114.

20
Enlightenment period the human ability to make rational
choices in pursuit of the human understanding of the good
gained new philosophical justifications.

With

industrialization new visions of the good life proliferated.
Political and social philosophy in the West struggled to
comprehend this situation with theories that encouraged
tolerance and reenforced belief in human potential for
autonomy and good.
In contemporary liberal theory one can see this
tradition continuing today.

John Rawls has carved a

leadership position in liberal theory for his Kantian
inspired discussion of justice, particularly with his
seminal A Theory of Justice.

Through the heuristic

mechanism of a hypothetical social contract 26 , Rawls uses
the devices of "an original position" 27 and "veil of
ignorance" 28 to arrive at his two principles of justice as
26

"My aim is to present a conception of
justice which generalizes and carries to a higher
level of abstraction the familiar theory of the
social contract as found, say, in Locke, Rousseau,
and Kant." Rawls, 1971, p. 11.
27

"In justice as fairness the original
position of equality corresponds to the state of
nature in the traditional theory of the social
contract. This original position is not, of
course, thought of as an actual historical state
of affairs, much less as a primitive condition of
culture.
It is understood as a purely
hypothetical situation characterized so as to lead
to a certain conception of justice." Ibid, p. 12.
28

"Among the essential features of this
situation is that no one knows his place in
society, his class position or social status, nor

21

fairness: "1) Each person is to have an equal right to the
most extensive total system of equal basic liberties
compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.

2)

Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that
they are both:

(a) to the greatest benefit of the least

advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle 29 ,
and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under
conditions of fair equality of opportunity.

1130

These two

principles of justice are concerned with the just and fair
distribution of all primary social goods, which consist of
"liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases
of self-respect" 31 and "are to be distributed equally
unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods
is to the advantage of the least favored. " 32

does any one know his fortune in the distribution
of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence,
strength, and the like. I shall even assume that
the parties do not know their conceptions of the
good or their special psychological propensities.
The principles of justice are chosen from behind a
veil of ignorance. This ensures that no one is
advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of
principles by the outcome of natural chance or the
contingency of social circumstances." Ibid.
"The just saving principle can be
regarded as an understanding between generations
to carry their fair share of the burden of
realizing and preserving a just society." Ibid, p.
29

289.
30

Ibid, p. 302.

31

Ibid, p. 303.

32

Ibid.
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The Western free will tradition is evidenced in Rawls'
concept of autonomy which is based upon his understanding of
the Kantian model as:
That a person is acting autonomously when the
principles of his action are chosen by him as the
most adequate possible expression of his nature as
a free and equal rational being. The principles
he acts upon are not adopted because of his social
position or natural endowments, or in view of the
particular kind of society in which he lives or
the specific things that he happens to want. To
act on such principles is to act
heteronomously. 33
Rawls uses the veil of ignorance in an attempt to create a
situation under which the principles of justice are to be
chosen by autonomous individuals.

"The parties arrive at

their choice together as free and equal rational persons
knowing only that those circumstances obtain which give rise
to the need for principles of justice. " 34

Additionally,

the circumstance of the original position Rawls believes
allow him to claim his theory as objective: "its
stipulations express the restrictions on arguments that
force us to consider the choice of principles unencumbered
by the singularities of the circumstances in which we find
ourselves" . 35
Rawls's Kantian affiliation is particularly evident in
his view of autonomy and its perspective on human

33

Ibid, p. 252.

34

Ibid.

35

Ibid, p. 516.
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rationality.

Rawls defines a person as "a human life lived

according to a plan. " 36

Furthermore, "a rational person is

thought to have a coherent set of preferences between the
options open to him.

He ranks these options according to

how well they further his purposes; he follows the plan
which will satisfy more of his desires rather than less, and
which has the greater chance of being successfully
executed. " 37
Rawls lists the ontological assumptions of the
creatures in the original position as: 1) mutually
disinterested rationality: "the persons in the original
position try to acknowledge principles which advance their
system of ends as far as possible ...

They do not wish a

high or a low score for their opponents, nor do they seek to
maximize or minimize the difference between their successes
and those of others. " 38

They do not possess a sense of

competition. 2) "The parties are presumed to be capable of a
sense of justice and this fact is public knowledge among
them. " 39
Below are Rawls' counting principles which demonstrate
the role of rational choice in justice as fairness and which
detail the rational choice process for short-term plans.
36

Ibid, p. 408.

37

Ibid, p. 143.

38

Ibid, p. 144.

39

Ibid, p. 145

24
- First, the principle of effective means.

"Given the

objective, one is to achieve it with the least
expenditure of means (whatever they are); or given
the means, one is to fulfill the objective to the
fullest possible extent. 1140
Second, the principle is "that one (short-term) plan is
to be preferred to another if its execution would
achieve all of the desired aims of the other plan
and one or more further aims in addition. " 41
- Third, the principle of greater likelihood holds "that
some objectives have a greater chance of being
realized by one plan than the other, yet at the
same time none of the remaining aims are less
likely to be attained.

1142

Rawls admits the slant of his theory's account of
rational choice and deliberative rationality by stating that
it is premised on an assumption "that there are no errors of
calculation or reasoning, and that the facts are correctly
assessed."

Rawls goes on to elaborate that "[h]is choice

may be an unhappy one, but if so it is because his beliefs
are understandably mistaken or his knowledge insufficient,
and not because he drew hasty and fallacious inferences or

40

Ibid, p. 412

41

Ibid.

42

Ibid.
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was confused as to what he really wanted. " 43

In discussing

the choice process Rawls notes that "the rationality of a
person's choice does not depend upon how much he knows, but
only upon how well he reasons from whatever information he
has, however incomplete. " 44

The rationality of the

available alternatives is evident when "there is no other
plan which, taking everything into account, would be
preferable. " 45

The Good
The outline Rawls sketches for us of the minimalist
creatures in the original position is not complete without
exploring further his thin theory of the good.

Although he

labels his theory deontological, the right being prior to
the good, he recognizes that justice as fairness is
incomplete without a theory of the good.

"It is necessary

to rely on some notion of goodness, for we need assumptions
about the parties' motives in the original position. " 46
The purpose of the skeleton of good which Rawls presents is
"to secure the premises about primary goods required to
arrive at the principles of justice" 47 and "to explicate
43

Ibid, p. 417.

44

Ibid, p. 397.

45

Ibid, p. 93.

46

Ibid, p. 396.

47

Ibid.
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the notion of rationality underlying the choice of
principles in the original position." 48

Rawls notes that a theory of the good facilitates
identifying the least favored members of society in the
difference principle.

In order for him to do so he requires

some criteria allowing him to identify those least and most
favored.

Additionally, his list of primary goods (with

self-respect heading the list) which rational individuals
desire for executing their plans of life, specifies
characteristics of the good.

Finally, "within the thin

theory it turns out that having a sense of justice is indeed
a good, then a well-ordered society is as stable as one can
hope for.

1149

With the thin theory of the good clarified, Rawls
admits that a full theory of the good is necessary once the
principles of justice are secured.

However, I will now

elaborate further on Rawls' theory of persons.

He

understands conceptions of the good, or life plans, as
rational if they lead to happiness.

For Rawls the rational

plan is the one which determines the individual's good, and
hence makes that individual happy 50 •
48

Ibid, p. 397.

49

Ibid, p. 398-9.

50

"The good is the

This understanding of the good based on
the list of primary goods Rawls includes in his
justice as fairness draws on a theory of good he
dates to Aristotle, which is accepted by a wide
range of philosophers, from Kant's contract
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satisfaction of rational desire. " 51

Rawls defines

happiness when an individual "is in the way of a successful
execution (more or less) of a rational plan of life drawn up
under (more or less) favorable conditions, and he is
reasonably confident that his plan can be carried through.
Someone is happy when his plans are going well, his more
important aspirations being fulfilled, and he feels sure
that his good fortune will endure.

1152

Richard Flathman is another leading liberal whose
insight into the good is embodied in his Liberal Principle
(LP).

Flathman's LP states that "It is a prima facie good

for persons to form, to act on, and to satisfy and achieve
desires and interests, objectives and purposes.

1153

His LP

"relies on claims about the usual characteristics of human
beings and their circumstances, but it is also contextualist
or culture-specific rather than transcendental or
universalistic.

1154

Flathman's LP and his individualist liberalism are
tempered by his recognition that "the interests and desires
that individuals form are an important part the result of

doctrine to Sidgwick's utilitarian liberalism.
Ibid, p. 93.
51

Ibid, p. 93.

52

Ibid, p. 409.

53

Flathman, 1989, p. 6.

54

Ibid.
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the location of those individuals in one of the many
differing cultural traditions and societies and, more
proximately, their associations and interactions with groups
of individuals in their own cultures and societies." 55

His

recognition of the importance of the context provides an
important linkage to the next section on the liberal state
and society.

LIBERAL STATE AND SOCIETY

The relationship between the individual and the state
in liberal theory plays a central role.

One of the earliest

liberal philosophers, John S. Mill, articulates the
authority of society over the individual and identifies the
emergence of this tradition as arising due to the
disintegration of the moral yoke of the Universal Church. 56
[m]inorities, seeing that they had no chance of
becoming majorities, were under the necessity of
pleading to those whom they could not convert, for
permission to differ. It is accordingly on this
battle-field, almost solely, that the rights of
the individual against society have been asserted
on broad grounds of principle, and the claims of
society to exercise authority over dissentients,
openly controverted. 57

55

Ibid, p. 8.

56

Mill, On Liberty, p. 7.

57

Ibid, p.7-8.
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In liberal theory the backdrop of the relationship
between the individual and his/her community is a conception
of society where certain conditions obtain.

In Ackerman's

tenets of liberalism, a number of presuppositions about
liberal society emerge: relative scarcity of some resources,
certainty of conflict and competition, and the need to
contain such conflict.

Also included in the preconditions

of the liberal polity is a modern state, with a commitment
to neutrality towards conceptions of the good, members of a
political community with a plurality of conceptions of the
good, and shared understanding of the need and desirability
to remain a community (which implies a shared language of
discourse) .

Ronald Dworkin would further add to this list

the mechanisms necessary to satisfy the principles of
liberalism "the two main institutions of our own political
economy: the economic market, for decisions about what goods
shall be produced and how they shall be distributed, and
representative democracy, for collective decisions about
what conduct shall be prohibited or regulated. " 58

Pluralism and Neutrality
Ackerman's second and sixth tenets address the issues
of plurality and state neutrality.

Charles Larmore in

Ronald Dworkin, "Liberalism, 11
Liberalism and Its Critics, ed. Michael Sandel
(New York: New York University Press, 1984), p.
58

66.
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Patterns of Moral Complexity elaborates on necessary

conditions for the liberal society to flourish: "pluralism,
or the idea that there are many viable conceptions of the
good life that neither represent different versions of some
single, homogeneous good nor fall into any discernible
hierarchy; and toleration, or the idea that because
reasonable persons disagree about the value of various
conceptions of the good life, we must learn to live with
those who do not share our ideals.

Neither pluralism nor

toleration makes any sense in the light of a monistic view
of the good life about which reasonable people will
supposedly agree.

1159

It is a liberal assumption (with which many nonliberals would agree) that a climate of choice characterized
by anarchy or totalitarian politics is destructive to human
potentials.

In Larmore's discussion of political liberalism

he identifies neutrality of the state as the distinguishing
feature of liberalism.

Larmore recognizes that some

historical versions of liberalism have not relegated
neutrality this central role (for example utilitarian
liberalism60 )

59

60

•

He notes that many liberals have justified

Larmore, 1987, p. 23.

Larmore maintains that classical
utilitarian liberalism fails to be neutral
"because it subscribes to a subjectivist
conception of the good and thus of the good life"
which is based upon a "neutral" standard of
pleasure or satisfaction. Ibid, p. 49.
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their belief in neutrality on the grounds of their
understanding of human needs/interests, such as skepticism,
experimentation, or individual autonomy.

Larmore believes

that these are not neutral grounds for justification of
political neutrality, but rather that they are a universal
form of rational dialogue.
Ronald Dworkin would agree with Larmore's assertion
that the concept of neutrality is central to liberalism.

He

holds that it is a person's view of equality which
determines whether they are liberal or not.

Specifically, a

liberal ascribes to a view of equality that supposes the
government to be neutral on the question of the good
life. 61

This understanding of equality means that

"resources and opportunities should be distributed, so far
as possible, equally, so that roughly the same share of
whatever is available is devoted to satisfying the ambitions
of each.

1162

Conflict and Stability
The conception of the individual in a state of natural
conflict, or antagonism, with others in society for limited
resources is found in many articulations of liberalism,
including Ackerman's fourth, fifth and sixth tenets.

It is

presumed that all societies will develop a plurality of
61

Dworkin, 1984, p. 64.

62

Ibid, p. 65.
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conceptions of the good by the very nature of human agency.
With, or without, a liberal climate which allows pluralism
to flourish, free will and agency will generate differences.
Flathman describes free agency in the communal context.
"Freedom" and "unfreedom" are predicates of human
actions. Roughly, actions are taken by (and hence
talk of both freedom and unfreedom presupposes)
persons who are "agents," that is, persons who, in
the setting of a community with a shared language
and the elements that Wittgenstein and others have
identified as necessary to such a language, form
and hold beliefs; form desires and interests,
objectives and purposes, that are influenced by
their beliefs; frame intentions to act to satisfy
their desires, interests, and so forth; and
attempt to act on their intentions. 63
Flathman's LP "namely, that it is a prima facie a good thing
for individuals to form, to act on, and more or less
regularly to satisfy (their) interests and desires, their
ends and purposes" 64 undergirds conceptions of the liberal
state.

However, this freedom of individual agency protected

in LP is not without limits.

The function of the state is

to referee the inevitable conflicting claims and freedoms.
"Because freedom and its values will be on both or all sides
of such conflicts, the conflicts cannot be resolved without
appeal to considerations other than freedom itself ." 65
In addition to the state, the mechanisms of
socialization also impose restrictions on the thoughts and

63

Flathman, 1989, p. 114.

64

Ibid, p. 116.

65

Ibid, p. 112.
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actions of members.

Flathman notes that "If as a

generalization liberals have tended to be more suspicious of
or cautious about these characteristics of modern Western
societies, if they have tended to be selective concerning
means of limiting diversity, they have denied neither the
social and political importance of limitations nor the
possibility of interpersonally convincing justifications for
the particular limitations adopted and imposed. " 66

This is

one traditional reason for the liberal emphasis on state
supported education which serves as an important factor in
socializing civic (i.e. liberal) values.
Emily Gill notes the importance of the context of
conflict in the individual's range of choices to resolve the
antagonisms that occur in a community.
Now if practices, the content of individual lives,
institutions, and traditions, all provide the
substance or occasions for conflict, individuals,
I believe, play two roles within these
continuities of conflict. First, they may choose
among various alternatives in attempts to resolve
conflicts, always choosing from within the context
of the imperatives of their particular
tradition(s). Second, their choices and
resolutions have an impact on them so that they
define themselves differently, whether singly or
in/as a group, as a result of their prior choices
and the experiences these choices represent, than
would be the case if they had not grappled with
the issues involved in these earlier conflicts. 67

66

67

Ibid, p. 9.

Emily R. Gill, "Goods, Virtues, and the
Constitution of the Self" in Alfonso J. Damico,
ed. Liberals on Liberalism (Totowa, New Jersey:
Rowman & Littlefield, 1986) p. 122.

34

Accompanying the presupposition of conflict is the
liberal belief that conflict should be controlled and that
stability should be sought.

An important role of the state

is to regulate and channel conflict.
It is reasonable to assume that even in a wellordered society the coercive powers of government
are to some degree necessary for the stability of
social cooperation .... The role of an authorized
public interpretation of rules supported by
collective sanctions is precisely to overcome this
instability. By enforcing a public system of
penalties government removes the grounds for
thinking that others are not complying with the
rules. For this reason alone, a coercive
sovereign is presumably always necessary, even
though in a well-ordered society sanctions are not
severe and may never need to be imposed. 68
This articulation by John Rawls of the need for stability he
labels "Hobbes' thesis. " 69

However, Rawls delineates the

limits of state coercion as legitimate only if the
disadvantages of the loss of liberty are less than the loss
of liberty from instability. 70
One final subject for discussion in this section on the
state and society in liberal philosophy involves liberal
perspectives on economic systems.

While there has been a

diversity of opinion amongst liberals over the best economic
system to obtain in the liberal polity, I will elaborate on
the above quotation about the development of wants and needs
from the work of John Rawls.
68

Rawls, p. 240.

69

Ibid.

70

Ibid, p. 241.
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Rawls begins his A Theory of Justice by describing the
primary subject of justice as the basic structure of
society 71 •

He proclaims that "[j]ustice is the first

virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of
thought." 72

How economic arrangements affect the

distribution of primary goods in society are intimately tied
to the justice of a social scheme.

"An economic system

regulates what things are produced and by what means, who
receives them and in return for which contributions, and how
large a fraction of social resources is devoted to saving
and to the provision of public goods. " 73
Another important level of interaction relevant to this
thesis between the individual and the context of choice is
the liberal conception how society influences wants.

Rawls

articulates this belief which he holds is perfectly obvious
and universally recognized:
The social system shapes the wants and aspirations
that its citizens come to have. It determines in
part the sort of person they want to be as well as
the sort of persons they are. Thus an economic
system is not only an institutional device for
satisfying existing wants and needs but a way of
creating and fashioning wants in the future. How
men work together now to satisfy their present
desires affects the desires they will have later
on, the kind of person they will be. 74

71

Ibid, p. 3 .

72

Ibid.

73

Ibid, p. 266.

74

Ibid, p. 259.
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The connection between economic systems and wants and needs
Rawls notes is stressed by economists from many perspectives
including Marx and Marshall7 5 •
Rawls variously mentions the following background
institutions in the choice of a just system: competitive
markets, private property in the means of production 76 ,
efficiency, 77 stability 78 , "discouraging desires which
conflict with the principles of justice" 79 such as envy,
preventing the establishment of monopolistic restrictions
and barriers, guaranteeing a free choice of occupations, a
certain minimum income to all citizens, establishing a
negative income tax 80 and the regulation of inheritance
"provided that the resulting inequalities are to the
advantage of the least fortunate and compatible with liberty
and fair equality of opportunity. " 81

Rawls holds that his

theory of justice admits a number of variations of just
economic systems, socialist included. 82
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Ibid.
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Ibid, p. 7 .
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Ibid, p. 360.
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Ibid, p. 261.
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Ibid.
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Ibid, p. 275.
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Ibid, p. 278.
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Ibid, p. 274.
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CONCLUSION

The above eclectic rendering of the presuppositions of
liberal theory as it pertains to community and individual
choice is not intended as a comprehensive overview of a body
of writing and ideas which have had an illustrious history.
Rather it attempts to draw out features of liberal theory
which are relevant to this thesis.

In the process some of

liberalism's shortcomings with regard to community and the
individual have been highlighted.
One feature of liberalism, as summarized here, is its
glossing over of the role of community in the development of
rational agency.

In liberal theory, such as that developed

by Rawls, the development of rational agency appears to
occur completely in isolation from society.

Another feature

of liberal theory, such as that espoused by Rawls and
Flathman, is its focus on institutions and arguments of
justice, which too often leave real policy challenges such
as minority rights in the shadows.

These are sharp

criticisms which have been leveled at many of the above
ontological and sociological points.

Subsequent chapters

will highlight such salient criticisms.
This chapter has relied heavily on the work of Rawls to
articulate contemporary liberal understandings of community
as related to the normative choice process, thus it seems
appropriate before launching into criticisms of liberalism
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to conclude with his definition of community.
The nature of the self as a free and equal moral
person is the same for all, and the similarity in
the basic form of rational plans expresses this
fact. Moreover, as shown by the notion of society
as a social union of social unions, the members of
a community participate in one another's nature:
we appreciate what others do as things we might
have done but which they do for us, and what we do
is similarly done for them. Since the self is
realized in the activities of many selves,
relations of justice that conform to principles
which would be assented to by all are best fitted
to express the nature of each. Eventually then
the requirements of a unanimous agreement connect
up with the idea of human beings who as members of
a social union seek the values of community. 83

83

Ibid, p. 565.
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CHAPTER III
CRITICS OF LIBERALISM

But I did not get my picture of the world by
satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I
have it because I am satisfied of its correctness.
No: it is the inherited background against which I
distinguish between true and false. 84
Ludwig Wittgenstein
On Certainty
Throughout a long history liberalism has sustained
attack from many quarters.

A summary of the critics of

liberalism during the course of its over two hundred year
tenure is beyond the possibility of this thesis.

Will

Kymlicka, a liberal theorist responds to the onslaught of
deep criticism of liberalism.

He writes that critics of the

liberal tradition have frequently attacked "different
targets--some discussions are directed at the articulated
premisses of specific liberal theorists, others at the
habits and predispositions of liberal-minded politicians and
jurists, yet others at some more nebulous world-view which
underlies Western culture generally, not just our political

84

Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, eds.
G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, trans. Denis
Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe (New York: Harper & Row,
1972)
p. 15e.
I
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culture. " 85

The body of literature I shall draw on for

this section critical of liberalism is that of contemporary
writers whose work is directly relevant to community and the
context of choice and who have directed their critique of
liberalism at issues related to community.

Amongst these

voices I shall give prominence to philosophers coming from
the diverse traditions of communitarian, nee-Aristotelian
and social democratic theory.
This chapter shall draw on the work of Alasdair
Macintyre, Benjamin Barber, Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel,
Michael Walzer, the cooperative work of Robert Bellah,
Richard Madsen, William Sullivan, Ann Swindler, and Steven
Tipton in their book Habits of the Heart, and others.

The

work of these theorists illustrates the narrative of human
life, the background frameworks of modern identity, the
meaning of membership in a community, and the limitations of
American individualism.
Communitarian critics of liberalism will be prominent
in this work, but comm.unitarians by no means expound a
cohesive philosophy 86 •
85

86

The communitarian tendency stands

Kymlicka, 1991, p. 9.

A roster of the communitarian camp is
nearly as difficult to compose as a precise
definition of this perspective. However, the
above authors are included either because they
label themselves thus, or because they share
specific criticisms of liberalism with selfdeclared comm.unitarians. For this reason Barber
is included with other comm.unitarians by Bernard
Yack, "Liberalism and its Communitarian Critics:
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in a position critical of liberalism which is united in a
conception of the self as situated in and constituted by
tradition, with membership in historically rooted community.
Much of the strength of the communitarian critiques of
liberalism lies in its response to liberal presuppositions
about human ontology and state and society.
This chapter will not match the exact headings that
were introduced in Chapter II where the presuppositions of
liberalism were examined.

It will respond to some of the

points and highlight distinctions and conflicts between
liberal and critical perspectives.

ONTOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Many critics of liberalism begin their attack on the
traditional liberal conception of the individual pursuing
their conceptions of the good in an unencumbered, free and
self-contained manner.
be inaccurate.

Christopher Lasch believes this to

"Liberals regard tradition as a collection

of prejudices that prevent the individual not only from
understanding his own needs but also from sympathetic

Does Liberal Practice 'Live Down' to Liberal
Theory", in Community in America: The Challenge of
Habits of the Heart, (Berkeley, California:
University of California Press, 1988), p. 147.
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understanding of others. " 87

Further criticism of an

ontological nature stem from the deontological liberalism
current today which avoids "reliance on any particular
theory of the person, at least in the traditional sense of
attributing to all human beings a determinate nature, or
certain essential desires and inclinations, such as
selfishness or sociability, for example 88 " .

Deontological Social Contract Theory
Particularly susceptible to this battle front is the
mechanism of the liberal contract theory.

While differing

in content this tool is utilized by such theorists as Kant,
Rousseau, and John Rawls.

The deontological social contract

theory of Rawls places the choice of the principles of
justice in a vacuum free from traditions, relationships, and
circumstances.

Some philosophers critical of liberalism

maintain that this theoretical purity prejudices the choice
process denying the embeddedness of the self.

While not all

liberals rely on the artifice of a social contract, and the
work of John Rawls does not represent the definitive liberal
theory, his prominence in the contemporary field of
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Christopher Lasch, "The Communitarian
Critique of Liberalism," Community in America: The
Challenge of Habits of the Heart, ed. & intro.
Charles H. Reynolds and Ralph V. Norman (Berkeley,
California: University of California Press, 1988),
p. 175.
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Sandel, 1982, p. 10.
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political theory, legal jurisprudence, and liberal
philosophy position his Theory of Justice as a major target
for critics of liberalism.
The theoretical mechanism of social contract theory has
many liberal champions.

Many philosophers have relied upon

social contract theory as an archimedean point from which to
prove their claims about principles of justice, political
reality, and so on.

This methodology has been questioned by

many as fundamentally flawed.
Alasdair Macintyre astutely observes that although
Rawls claims that justice as fairness would be chosen by
rational well-meaning men from behind "a veil of ignorance",
he denies "the inescapably historical and socially contextbound character which any substantive set of principles of
rationality, " 89 or conceptions of the good, inevitably
have.
In Michael J. Sandel's book Liberalism and the Limits
of Justice the work of John Rawls is at the core of his

critique of liberalism.

One of his targets is the validity

of the Rawlsian social contract theory and its ontological
implications.

Rawls freely admits the hypothetical nature

of the circumstances of the original position, 90 and
justifies its validity on the grounds that it reflects our

89

Ibid, p. 4.

90

Rawls, 1971, p. 12, 21, 120.
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inherent sense of justice and moral judgement. 91

Sandel

writes that the validity of social contract theory does not
depend on its terms actually having been agreed to, but
rather on the idea that they would have been agreed to under
the requisite hypothetical conditions.

In fact, Rawls'

hypothetical social contract is even more imaginary than
most.

Not only did his contract never really happen; it is

imagined to take place among the sorts of beings who never
really existed, that is, beings struck with the kind of
complicated amnesia necessary to the veil of ignorance.

In

this sense, Rawls's theory is doubly hypothetical 92 •
Sandel goes on to argue that Rawls is forced to rely
upon such beings in his theory because he recognizes the
situatedness of humans in practices and conventions of
justice which are contrary to his deontological commitments.
"As the self is prior to the ends it affirms, so the
contract is prior to the principles it generates.

Of

course, .... real persons, ordinarily conceived as 'thick with
particular traits', are not strictly prior with respect to
their ends, but are embedded in and conditioned by the
values and interests and desires from among which the
'sovereign' self, qua subject of possessions, would take its
purposes . " 93
91

Ibid, 120.
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Sandel, 1982, p. 105.
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Ibid, p. 120-1.
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Charles Taylor in his seminal work Sources of the Self
has contributed to this critique of social contract theory
with a discussion of the modern notion of freedom.
The ancient notion of the good, either in the
Platonic mode, as the key to cosmic order, or in
the form of the good life a'la Aristotle, sets a
standard for us in nature, independent of our
will. The modern notion of freedom which develops
in the seventeenth century portrays this as the
independence of the subject, his determining of
his own purposes without interference from
external authority .... Normative orders must
originate in the will. This is most evident in
the seventeenth century political theory of
legitimacy through contract. As against earlier
contract theories, the one we find with Grotius
and Locke starts from the individual. 94
While not all liberals have relied upon the device of
the social contract to build their cases for liberalism, it
has been an important tradition to liberal philosophy and
hence frequently has served as a target for critics of
liberalism.

Agency and Choice
The concept of autonomy is a central presupposition of
the liberal experiment and of much Western morality as well.
As Charles Taylor phrases it: "To talk of universal,
natural, or human rights is to connect respect for human
life and integrity with the notion of autonomy.

It is to

conceive of people as active cooperators in establishing and
ensuring the respect which is due them .... So autonomy has a
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central place in our understanding of respect. " 95

As seen

in the previous chapter Rawls defines autonomous choice of
principles as completely divorced from all social forces, or
a person is not acting autonomously, but heteronomously.
Sandel asserts that the centrality of choice to Rawls's
theory of justice is essential for his deontological
priority of the self and his priority of procedure which
"require the voluntarist notions of agency and
justification.

For the self to be prior, its aims must be

chosen rather than given; for contract to be prior, the
principles of justice must be products of agreement rather
than objects of discovery. " 96
Sandel's discussion of the Rawlsian conception of
choice and the role of reflection and agency is an important
one.

Sandel understands "human agency as the faculty by

which the self comes by its ends. " 97

Sandel holds that

Rawls's principles of justice are antecedently derived,
since they are in force as soon as the veil of ignorance is
removed.

Therefore, human agency is not exercised in the

choice of the principles.

Furthermore, Sandel points out

that even after the veil of ignorance has been lifted in
choosing individual conceptions of the good, Rawls presents
conflicting views, at times maintaining that each person is
95

Ibid, p. 12.

96

Sandel, p. 122.

97

Ibid, p. 58.

47

free to choose according to their needs and desires and at
other points presenting limiting conditions.

One limitation

is that the principles of justice will take priority when
plans of life clash with them, so not all conceivable plans
of life will conform to justice as fairness.

Another

narrowing circumstance according to Sandel is that:
at times Rawls writes as though the principles of
justice shape a person's conception of the good
from the start, even as the conception is
formulated ... At other times Rawls seems to favor
the second account, as when he writes that in
justice as fairness, persons 'implicitly
agree .... to conform their conceptions of the good
to what the principles of justice require, or at
least not to press claims which directly violate
them' . 98
A further constraint on the Rawlsian circumstances of
choice are the counting principles (as outlined on page 21-2
of this thesis), which Sandel states "amount roughly to the
basic tenets of instrumental rationality. " 99
In Sandel's discussion of agency in A Theory of Justice
he reconstructs the deontological subject of Rawls's theory.
In Rawls's scheme of things, agency and ends ultimately are
found under the conception of the good.

"Like the right,

the good is conceived voluntaristically; it is founded in
choice.

As the principles of right are the product of a

collective choice in the original position, conceptions of
the good are the products of individual choices in the real

98
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Ibid, p. 158.

48
world.

11100

The voluntarist notion of agency in the choice process
of rational life plans demonstrates the impoverished notion
of reflection found in Rawls . 101

While Rawls admits that

reflection is part of the principles of rationality, Sandel
holds that he then limits the objects of reflection to "(1)
the various alternative plans and their likely consequences
for the realization of the agent's desires, and (2) the
agent's wants and desires themselves, and their relative
intensities.

11102

Sandel' s critique of Rawls' (1) is that it

is an outward not inward form of reflection and is a "kind
of prudential reasoning 11103 , and (2) is a relatively
superficial self-reflection, examining wants and desires not
the self.

"Since for Rawls the faculty of self-reflection

is limited to weighing the relative intensity of existing
wants and desires, the deliberation it entails cannot
inquire into the identity of the agent,

('Who

am ~'

really?') only into feelings and sentiments of the agent
('What do I really feel like or most prefer?').

Because

this sort of deliberation is restricted to assessing the
desires of a subject whose identity is given
(unreflectively) in advance, it cannot lead to self100
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understanding in the strong sense which enables the agent to
participate in the constitution of its identity.

11104

Sandel points out that reflection on the type of beings
in Rawls's world of justice is not possible,
first because the kind of beings we are is
antecedently given and not subject to revision in
the light of reflection or any other form of
agency, and second, because Rawls' self is
conceived as barren of constituent traits,
possessed only of contingent attributes held
always at a certain distance, and so there is
nothing in the self for reflection to survey or
apprehend. For Rawls, the identity of the subject
can never be at stake in moments of choice or
deliberation (although its future aims and
attributes may of course be affected) , for the
bounds that define it are beyond the reach of the
agency -- whether voluntarist or cognitive -- that
would contribute to its transformation. 105
Although Sandel's criticisms go beyond the paucity of
Rawlsian agents potential for reflection to his whole
theory, it is obvious that Rawls' beings are "incapable of
making sense of what choice and deliberation could possibly
consist of 11 106 , which is essential here.
If the good is nothing more than the
indiscriminate satisfaction of arbitrarily-given
preferences, regardless of worth, it is not
difficult to imagine that the right (and for that
matter a good many other sorts of claims) must
outweigh it. But in fact the morally diminished
status of the good must inevitably call into
question the status of justice as well. For once
it is conceded that our conceptions of the good
are morally arbitrary, it becomes difficult to see
why the highest of all (social) virtues should be
104
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the one that enables us to pursue these arbitrary
conceptions 'as fully as circumstances
permit' . 107
Benjamin Barber in his collection of essays The
Conquest of Politics: Liberal Philosophy in Democratic Times
highlights the difficulties encountered in Rawlsian
conception of rationality and choice.

The recipe for

guiding choice in uncertain conditions is referred to as the
maximin rule meaning "the maximum minimorum; and the rule
directs our attention to the worst that can happen under any
proposed course of action, and to decide in the light of
that. " 108

Rawls projects that because of circumstances of

uncertainty for individuals in the original position, it is
rational to choose the more conservative options.

Is this

yet another sighting of the Rawlsian hypothetical being?
As Barber points out there are other rules which parties
might apply to their choices in this situation such as a
moderate-risk strategy,
whose aim would be to create the possibility of
somewhat greater gains than those afforded the
maximin, even at the risk of somewhat greater
possible losses. Indeed, the scarcity built into
all contractarian views of society--and Rawls's is
no exception on this point--enhances the
attractiveness of gambling strategies that, should
the individual win, permit him far greater
benefits than those allowed by an austere
egalitarianism .... Lotteries function precisely on
this basis. Given still more radical assumptions
about attitudes towards risk, one can contend that
some men may choose rationally to risk starvation,
107
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even death, for the chance--even against the odds-to be very rich or very powerful. War is an
extreme but hardly irrational example of this winall/lose-all strategy. The development of
capitalism is scarcely thinkable in the absence of
high-risk attitudes in the face of uncertainty. A
consideration of actual historical developments
and concrete institutions as they manifest special
psychologies may in fact suggest that the no-risk
predilection for security is atypical of human
choice in the face of uncertainty. 109
Taylor is critical of the disengaged self-responsible
agent of Locke and Kant.

He holds that this is not only an

erroneous perspective of agency, but that it is unnecessary
as a support to self-responsible reason and freedom.

Taylor

states that while understandable "it involves reading the
stance of disengagement, whereby we objectify facets of our
own being, into the ontology of the subject, as though we
were by nature an agency separable from everything merely
given in us.

11110

Rationality and the Good
Alasdair Macintyre is also an important critic of
liberalism.

In his book Whose Justice? Which Rationality?

he narrates the history of four traditions of enquiry
connecting justice with understandings of practical
rationality111 •

In this study Macintyre's astute
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The four traditions Macintyre examines
are Aristotelian, Augustinian, Humean, and
Liberal. Alasdair Macintyre, Whose Justice? Which
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scholarship is brought to bear on the works of contemporary
liberal philosophy.

He alludes to the work of Rawlsian

rationality when he writes:
Rationality requires, so it has been argued by a
number of academic philosophers, that we first
divest ourselves of allegiance to any one of the
contending theories and also abstract ourselves
from all those particularities of social
relationship in terms of which we have been
accustomed to understand our responsibilities and
interests. Only by so doing, it has been
suggested, shall we arrive at a genuinely neutral,
impartial, and, in this way, universal point of
view, freed from the partisanship and the
partiality and onesidedness that otherwise affect
us. And only by so doing shall we be able to
evaluate the contending accounts of justice
rationally. 112
Macintyre goes on to point out that the notion of "ideal
rationality as consisting in the principles which a socially
disembodied being would arrive at illegitimately ignores the
inescapable historically and socially context-bound
character which any substantive set of principles of
rationality, whether theoretical or practical, is bound to
have.

11113

Furthermore, Macintyre disputes the neutrality between
conceptions of the good claimed by liberals.

"Thus

liberalism, while initially rejecting the claims of any
overriding theory of the good, does in fact come to embody

Rationality? (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1988).
112
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just such a theory .... Like other traditions liberalism has
internal to it its own standards of rational
justification. " 114
In Macintyre's A Short History of Ethics his
understanding of Aristotelian ethics and choice is
demonstrated by human rationality "in two kinds of
activities: in thinking, where reasoning is what constitutes
the activity itself; and in such activities other than
thinking where we may succeed or fail in obeying the
precepts of reason 11115 •

Human success or failure in

following the course of reason is the basis for virtue, and
virtuous action is the result of free choice; "We are not
called good or bad, we are not praised or blamed, by reason
of our emotions or capacities.

It is rather what we choose

to do with them that entitles us to be called virtuous or
vicious.

"116

Virtuous action must also be completely voluntary, i.e.
not done under circumstances of compulsion or due to
ignorance: 117 "voluntary action in a positive sense is that
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choice and deliberation have a key role in it. " 118
Macintyre notes that "[a]ccording to liberalism, individuals
and groups not only do but should develop and pursue their
conceptions of good 'voluntarily,' and where this is the
case these conceptions have differed widely and can be
expected to continue to do so.

11119

According to

Macintyre's interpretation of Aristotle, the claim is not
being made that humans are only rational creatures, rather
that "the standards by which men judge their own actions are
those of reason .... and that men characteristically act
rationally.

11120

The whole discussion of human rationality and the
process of rational choice has many risks involved,
particularly if the philosopher claims it is done outside a
communal context.

As Charles Taylor points out arrogance

and ethnocentricism may result when attempting to define
rationality in isolation from how particular cultures
articulate their differing conceptions of the world and
human action. 121

Taylor also notes the preeminence of

rationality in the Kantian universal scheme of things and
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the dangers this can pose.
Kant shares the modern stress on freedom as selfdetermination. He insists on seeing the moral law
as one which emanates from our will. Our awe
before it reflects the status of rational agency,
its author, and whose being it expresses.
Rational agents have a status that nothing else
enjoys in the universe. They soar above the rest
of creation. 122
An

understanding of the nature of choices concerned

only with how we should act 123 , determined by a set of
rules for conduct of a single standard, or possibly measured
in terms of fulfillment of desire 124 , or maybe explained in
terms of enlightened self-interest, is the norm in
contemporary philosophy.

However, as Taylor and others

point out, this theoretical certitude does little to
describe the choice process of the individual in a complex
environment where rationality is rarely the overriding
consideration.
122

Taylor, 1989, p. 83.

123

The standard in contemporary philosophy
is to give a narrow focus to issues of morality.
"Morality is conceived purely as a guide to
action .... the major contenders in these stakes
are utilitarianism, and different derivations of
Kant's theory, which are action focussed and offer
answers exactly of this kind." {Taylor, 1989, p.
79.)

Taylor maintains that utilitarianism
leads the field in denying that there are
qualitative distinctions of good. "A good,
happiness, is recognized. But this is
characterized by a polemical refusal of any
qualitative discrimination .... There is just
desire, and the only standard which remains is the
maximization of its fulfillment." {Taylor, 1989,
p. 78).
124
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Larmore notes that "[a]n abiding assumption of much of
moral philosophy has been that ultimately there must be a
single source of moral value.

The continual controversy

between 'deontological' and 'consequentialist' theories is
an important example of this simplification.

Kantians and

utilitarians, the best-known protagonists of these two
camps, have both supposed that in the last analysis the
structure of morality must be either deontological
(involving a set of absolute duties we must heed whatever
others may do as a result of what we do) or consequentialist
(demanding that we bring about the greatest good overall, so
that what we ought to do depends on how we expect others to
react to what we do) . " 125

Atomism and Identity
As noted earlier, the liberal concept of autonomy is
the basis of respecting the individual.

However, many

communitarians and critics of liberalism maintain that in
addition to the respect due an individual based on their
rationality and autonomy, the word "respect" and how it is
translated is only rendered coherent to members in a
particular community.

The concept of membership is central

to the work of Michael Walzer in Spheres of Justice: A

Defense of Pluralism and Equality.

"The primary good that

Charles E. Larmore, Patterns of Moral
(Columbia University, New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. xi.
125

Complexity,
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we distribute to one another is membership in some human
conununity.

11126

For it is only as members somewhere that

men and women can hope to share in all the other social
goods--security, wealth, honor, office, and power--that
conununal life makes possible.
The development of the atomistic presupposition of
liberalism is addressed by Elizabeth Wolgast in her book The
Grammar of Justice, which describes the historical
development of the theoretical construct of the atomistic
individual.
Standing against the old authorities required a
secure point, an Archimedean point from which to
strike. So it happened that in a variety of
fields--science, theology, political theory,
morality--such a point was located in the
autonomous, unconnected, rational human
individual. Starting with this person and his or
her inherent abilities, requirements and values,
one got a neutral and detached perspective on any
claim to authority. Thus a new kind of moral,
political and epistemological justification came
into being, one that derived from the natural,
free, rational, and morally autonomous
individual . 127
Prominent in the works of Macintyre and Taylor is their
exploration of the concept of modern identity, and the
consequences of the liberal atomistic self.

Charles Taylor

in his work on Hegel writes:

Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A
Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic
Books, Inc., 1983), p. 31.
126

Elizabeth H. Wolgast, The Grammar of
Justice {Ithaca, New York: Cornell University
Press, 1987), p. 2.
127
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We can think that the individual is what he is in
abstraction from his community only if we are
thinking of him qua organism. But when we think
of a human being, we do not simply mean a living
organism, but a being who can think, feel, decide,
be moved, respond, enter into relations with
others; and all this implies a language, a related
set of ways of experiencing the world, of
interpreting his feelings, understanding his
relation to others, to the past, the future, the
absolute, and so on. It is the particular way he
situates himself within this cultural world that
we call his identity. 120
The social contract theory of Rawls and the portrait of
choice presented in his theory of justice mock this rich
situatedness.

The atomism fostered by liberal rights based

moral and legal philosophy in modernity has consequences for
the modern identity and also the community.

"An

instrumental stance to our own feelings divides us from
within, splits reason from sense.

And the atomistic focus

on our individual goals dissolves community and divides us
f ram each other.

11129

Taylor articulates the connections between the self and
the community, providing the context for theory grounded in
contemporary realities.

"And only in this way was it

possible to show the connections between the modern moral
outlook and its multiple sources, on one hand, and the
different evolving conceptions of the self and its

° Charles Taylor, "Hegel: History and
Politics," in Liberalism and its Critics, ed.
Michael Sandel, (New York: New York University
Press, 1984), p. 182.
12
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characteristic powers, on the other; and to show also how
these concepts of the self are connected with certain
notions of inwardness, which are thus peculiarly modern and
are themselves interwoven with the moral outlook. " 130
Macintyre poses a challenge to the individualism of
modernity by presenting a pre-modern understanding of the
self as part of a lifelong narrative: "A concept of a self
whose unity resides in the unity of a narrative which links
birth to life to death as narrative beginning to middle to
end". 131

As Sandel succinctly summarizes this criticism of

liberalism, "in contrast to the liberal's unencumbered self,
Macintyre proposes a narrative conception of the self, a
self constituted in part by a life story with a certain
telos, or point.

As the telos is not fixed or fully

identifiable in advance, the unity of a life is the unity of
a narrative quest, a quest whose object is a fuller and more
adequate grasp of a good only intimated at the outset." 132
Macintyre notes that not only does the unity of a
narrative self hold the individual accountable for their
actions, but that other narratives are woven into the
individual self, thus making all intelligible.

"The

narrative of any one life is part of an interlocking set of
narratives ... The concepts of narrative, intelligibility and
130
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accountability presuppose the applicability of the concept
of personal identity, just as it presupposes their
applicability and just as indeed each of these three
presupposes the applicability of the two others.

The

relationship is one of mutual presupposition. " 133

THE STATE AND SOCIETY

Many of the basic issues about identity and what it is
to be human in the dominant liberal theory are deeply
questioned by communitarians and others.
but one front of the attack on liberalism.

However, this is
There are also

many critical of liberal presuppositions about state and
society as well as problems which are perceived as the
inheritance of modern liberal societies.

Neutrality and Pluralism
Much contemporary political theory shares the
presupposition of the human capacity of agency.

While Rawls

places limitations on this capacity in the choice of the
principles of justice, and as argued above, even in the
choice of conceptions of the good, communitarians would
place agency in a context of community, recognizing the
situatedness of humans in their common language and
133
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traditions.

Both communitarians and liberals would argue

that in order for conceptions of the good to proliferate, a
climate of tolerance must be present.
One of the conditions of a liberal society is the
concept of pluralism.

Liberals like Larmore would hold that

neutrality of the state is the best way for a climate of
toleration to flourish.

Yet communitarians would point out

that the atomistic individualism in modern society is
vulnerable to alienation134 and anomie.

These conditions

lead more to anarchy than a condition of pluralism.

Many

communitarians share the belief "that intolerance flourishes
most where forms of life are dislocated, roots unsettled,
traditions undone.

In our day, the totalitarian impulse has

sprung less from the convictions of confidently situated
selves than from the confusion of atomized, dislocated,
frustrated selves, at sea in a world where common meanings
have lost their force. " 135
The liberal assertion that state neutrality is the best
way for pluralism to flourish has been questioned by many
critics.

This extensive debate is not over the ideal of

neutrality but over its possibility.

Liberal critics, from

many quarters, would hold that what is often passed off as

134
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neutrality is nothing of the sort, but the promoting of
liberal values and a liberal conception of the good.
Dworkin's definition of liberal equality as state
neutrality vis-a-vis conceptions of the good, is interesting
in light of Hegel's comments as interpreted by Taylor.

That

"the modern ideology of equality and of total participation
leads to a homogenization of society. " 136

Taylor holds

that homogenization will eventually lead to the destruction
of pluralism, which is a central tenet of liberalism; in
other words, liberalism's commitment to neutrality is
destructive to the very qualities it is intended to promote.
Michael Walzer's insights into pluralism note the
limitations of pluralism and the particularity of this
concept.

The relativity of his understanding distinguishes·

his theory from liberalism, although at times he has called
himself a liberal.
Even if we choose pluralism, as I shall do, that
choice still requires a coherent defense. There
must be principles that justify the choice and set
limits to it, for pluralism does not require us to
endorse every proposed distributive criteria or to
accept every would-be agent. Conceivably, there
is a single principle and a single legitimate kind
of pluralism. But this would still be a pluralism
that encompassed a wide range of distributions.
By contrast, the deepest assumption of most of the
philosophers who have written about justice, from
Plato onwards, is that there is one, and only one,
distributive system that philosophy can rightly
encompass . 137
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Conflict and Stability
The liberal presupposition that the role of the state
is to minimize the inevitable conflict and thus nurture a
stable environment 138 is also shared by many critics of
liberalism.

The recognition that this foundation is one of

liberalism's strengths is eloquently stated by Benjamin
Barber:
[L]iberal philosophy possesses important political
strengths--above all, the capacity to endow its
institutions with stability and to provide rights
and liberties (including property) with a powerful
bulwark against statist tyranny. Nowhere were its
strengths more visible than in the struggles for
emancipation from feudalism, hierarchy, and
absolute monarchy that were the political
signature of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. Liberal theory as dissent theory
created an ideology of emancipation crucial to the
emergence of the modern democratic state. Yet in
democratic times, when the initial emancipatory
struggles are concluded, philosophies of
resistance lose much of their political force. To
posit and then theorize the individual as an
abstract solitary may be helpful on the way to
loosening feudal bonds and demarcating a clear
space for rebels attempting to individuate
themselves from a hierarchical and oppressive
order. But it may appear as an obstructive
exercise in nostalgia in an era when the extent
and quality of citizenship are in question and
when the bonds that hold together free communities
are growing slack. 139
As pointed out in the section on conflict and stability
in Chapter II, liberals condone the state's right to

Ackerman's #3, relative scarcity leads
to conflict, #4, #5, & #6 further define the
inevitability of conflict and its desired
minimization.
138
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coercion only if citizens would loose greater liberty due to
instability.

However, while many critics of liberalism

examined in this thesis would agree that stability is
desirable - and that the institutions of the modern state
and representative democracy ideally promote stability they might question how this ideal has translated into
practice in the modern liberal state.
Taylor writes that an assumption of much of modern
political theory has to do with the purpose of society.
"Society was justified not by what it was or expressed, but
by what it achieved, the fulfillment of men's needs, desires
and purposes.

Society came to be seen as an instrument and

its different modes and structures were to be studied
scientifically for their effects on human happiness.

11140

Taylor observes that the instrumentalist inclination of
modern society141 has public consequences for the heal th of
democratic society.

Necessary conditions for self-

government include:
a strong sense of identification of the citizens
with their public institutions and political way
of life, and may also involve some
decentralization of power when the central
institutions are too distant and bureaucratized to
sustain a continuing sense of participation by
themselves. These conditions are under threat in
our highly concentrated and mobile societies,
140
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Taylor holds that over the last two
centuries the disengaged instrumental mode of
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theories of modernity. Taylor, 1989, p. 499.
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which are so dominated by instrumentalist
considerations in both economic and defense
policies. What is worse, the atomist outlook
which instrumentalism fosters makes people unaware
of these conditions, so that they happily support
policies which undermine them--as in the recent
rash of nee-conservative measures in Britain and
the United States, which cut welfare programmes
and regressively redistribute income, thus eroding
the bases of community identification. 142
While the atomist inclination of liberalism has been
discussed earlier, Taylor notes that this inclination is
exacerbated by the instrumental tendency toward stability in
modern society.

Taylor's discussion of the homogenization

of modern society ref erred to earlier is a further danger in
the quest for stability.
Modern societies have moved towards much greater
homogeneity and greater interdependence, so that
partial communities have lost their autonomy and
to some extent their identity. But great
differences remain; only because of the ideology
of homogeneity, these differential characteristics
no longer have meaning and value for those who
have them. Thus the rural population is taught by
the mass media to see itself as lacking in some of
the advantages of a more advanced life style. The
poor are seen as marginal to society in America,
and in some ways have a worse lot than in more
recognizedly class-divided societies. 143
In modern capitalist America there is no distinction between
poverty--being poor--and frugality, and little dignity in
any condition of scarcity, chosen or inherited.

It can be

safely stated that American consumption patterns (consuming
over 60% of the world's resources) combined with the social
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rejection of principles of frugality is already having
significant consequences for the sustainable future of the
global environment.
Homogenization thus frequently increases minority
alienation and resentment.

And the first response of

liberal society is to try even more of the same: programs to
eliminate poverty, or assimilate Indians, move populations
out of declining regions, bring an urban way of life to the
countryside, etc .. 144

While this reduction of certain

distinguishing features may have some immediate benefits in
promoting stability and reducing conflict, its long-term
impact on the pluralism and diversity necessary for the
liberal polity are a subject of debate.

Public versus Private
Another challenge facing liberalism is that rightsbased political and legal liberalism has been unable to
recognize the essential bond between member and
community . 145

By ignoring that relationship in the

theoretic realm, the political system and its policies based
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Sandel holds that "whether egalitarian
or libertarian, rights-based liberalism begins
with the claims that we are separate, individual
persons, each with our own aims, interests, and
conceptions of the good, and seeks a framework of
rights that will enable us to realize our capacity
as free moral agents, consistent with a similar
liberty for others." Sandel, 1984, p. 4.
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on individual rights has contributed to a deterioration in
the quality of modern life.

Further, some critics maintain

that rights based liberalism has done grave damage to the
community as well as to the individual.

This position might

further assert that the atomistic focus of the dominant
post-Enlightenment philosophical tradition has denied the
strength and necessity of this relationship, and thus,
misunderstood human needs and interests.
Examining the instrumental view of society through a
liberal lens one finds the basic concept that civil society
is the result of voluntary association developed in order to
advance private purposes more effectively.

Christopher

Lasch summarizes this liberal tendency, "its solitude for
individual rights extends to the right of association, but
it finds it hard to conceive of voluntary associations
except as pressure groups seeking to influence public policy
in their own favor.
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Lasch further writes that his

objection to this perspective is that "it is too narrow a
conception of the public interest.
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The distinction between public and private, so
dear to liberals, doesn't catch the important
concerns, the ones that really matter. On the one
hand, it takes too narrow a view of the public
Christopher Lasch, "The Communitarian
Critique of Liberalism," Community in America: The
Challenge of Habits of the Heart, ed. & intro. by
Charles H. Reynolds, and Ralph V. Norman
(Berkeley, California: University of California
Press, 1988), p. 183.
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interest. On the other hand it trivializes the
activities that need to be protected and
nourished. Liberalism is at its best when it
condemns invasions of privacy; but this best is
still not good enough. The concept of privacy has
no moral content. It equates freedom not with
submission to an exacting discipline but with the
absence of constraint, the right to do as one
pleases, the right to change one's mind every day.
Both liberals and so-called conservatives adhere
to this empty ideal of freedom and privacy; they
disagree only about what is truly private. 148
Taylor adds to this thought the insight of Hegel who
believed that with the coming of individualism "men cease to
identify with the community's life, when they 'reflect',
that is, turn back on themselves, and see themselves most
importantly as individuals with individual goals .... the most
meaningful experience, which seems to him most vital, to
touch most the core of his being, is private. " 149
Among Sandel's criticism of Rawls is the conception of
community on which his theory of justice is premised.

While

Rawls provides two accounts of community, instrumental 150
and sentimental, 1 51 both are premised on the
148
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Taylor, 1984, p. 186-7.

"Subjects of co-operation are assumed to
be governed by self-interested motivations alone,
and the good of community consists solely in the
advantages individuals derive from co-operating in
pursuit of their egotistic ends." Sandel, 1982,
p. 148.
150

"The good of community for Rawls
consists not only in the direct benefits of social
co-operation but also in the quality of
motivations and ties of sentiment that may attend
this cooperation and be enhanced in the process."
151
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individualistic self.
So it would appear that community in the strong,
constitutive sense required by both Rawls and
Dworkin cannot be accounted for by a conception
that is individualistic even in Rawls' special
sense of the term. For the individualistic
account takes the bounds of the subject as
antecedently given and finally fixed, but Rawls
and Dworkin require a conception capable of
marking out a wider subject of possession, a
conception in which the subject is empowered to
participate in the constitution of its
identity. 152
As discussed in the previous section Rawls' account of
agency is truncated and thus disallows the individual
required by his understanding of community.
The work of Bellah et al in Habits of the Heart:
Individualism and Commitment in American Life uses a

descriptive mode of research and writing to comment on the
state of American life in the words of ordinary citizens.
Through questioning individuals about their values,
commitments, and the problems they perceive in their
community the authors of this experiment examine "the extent
to which private life either prepares people to take part in
the public world or encourages them to find meaning
exclusively in the private sphere, and the degree to which
public life fulfills our private aspirations or discourages
us so much that we withdraw from involvement in it.

Ibid, p. 149.
152

Ibid, p. 152
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Bellah, 1985, p. ix.

11153

70

Their reasons for such an investigation were dictated by
their concern that moral questions in contemporary American
society are too frequently relegated to the realm of private
anxiety, "as if it would be awkward or embarrassing to make
it public ... [m]any doubt that we have enough in common to be
able to mutually to discuss our central aspirations and
fears. " 154
In the history of liberal theory, discussions of
private versus public concerns have frequently been
addressed.

However in contemporary versions of this debate

the critics of liberalism have leveled some particularly
deep criticisms at liberal theorists.

It may be the

particular crises which contemporary societies are facing,
as well as the particular articulations of liberal theory
which are currently in the dominant position, which add fuel
to these criticisms.

CONCLUSION

While liberals recognize the need for certain social
preconditions in which liberalism can flourish, critics are
quick to point out that there are many aspects of
contemporary society which are not incorporated in liberal
theory or addressed as real problems by liberal theorists:
154
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the instrumental nature of modernity, the homogenization of
plural society, the dangers of individualistic atomism,

anomie, and alienation.

This situation leads to theory

which is insulated from the challenges of contemporary life,
and whose conclusions may well be inaccurate or even
irrelevant.
A number of unifying features are found among the
critics of liberalism examined in this chapter.

First, John

Rawls and deontological liberalism are central targets.
Second, concern about community and real challenges facing
American society are expressed.

Third, the voices listened

to are united in identifying the inadequacy of the liberal
portrait of the disengaged self.

Whether it is Macintyre's

narrative self, or Sandel's embedded self, they all plead to
widen the liberal ontology (or to completely replace it) :
crediting factors beyond the narrow confines of the
atomistic disengaged self.

Many state the purpose of this

plea as dissatisfaction with liberal theory's understanding
of the relationship between the individual and community and
the damage that this has done.
However, these critics of liberalism also share, in the
analysis of this thesis, serious theoretical limitations in
providing a viable replacement for the leading philosophical
paradigm of contemporary American society, liberalism.
While many of their criticisms are persuasive and their
prose eloquent, they fail to challenge the theoretical
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strength of liberalism's theory of justice and expression of
individual rights vis-a-vis a bureaucratized, centralized
and sometimes oppressive state.

The recognition that

liberalism still remains the preeminent philosophical option
does not (and should not) insulate it from criticism.

It is

toward those philosophers from within this tradition that
this thesis will now turn to help expand, not destroy, the
liberal project.
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CHAPTER IV

LIBERALS RESPOND

It is a commonplace amongst communitarians,
socialists, and feminists alike that liberalism is
to be rejected for its excessive 'individualism'
or 'atomism', for ignoring the manifest ways in
which we are 'embedded' or 'situated' in various
social roles and communal relationships. The
effect of these theoretical flaws is that
liberalism, in a misguided attempt to protect and
promote the dignity and autonomy of the
individual, has undermined the associations and
communities which alone can nurture human
flourishing. 155
Will Kymlicka
Liberalism, Community and Culture
The communitarian attack on liberalism has not gone
unanswered by liberals.

The deep criticism of liberalism's

shortcomings have led some liberals to reexamine their own
traditions and reformulate liberal responses according to
contemporary challenges.
A leader in this renewed liberalism is Will Kymlicka.
In his book Liberalism, Community and Culture he is critical
of liberal indifference or hostility towards collective
rights of minority cultures, but nonetheless aligns himself
with that tradition.
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Kymlicka's focus is on liberalism's

Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and
(Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1991), p.
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broader account of individual membership in a community and
a culture and how the liberal polity could better address
real policy issues such as that presented by the dilemma of
minority rights.
The recent work of William A. Galston, Liberal

Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State
also addresses from within the liberal tradition many
problems identified by critics of liberalism.

Galston uses

a discussion of the current trend within liberalism of state
neutrality (e.g. Rawls and Larmore) to begin articulating
the list of implicit liberal virtues.

Concerned with the

depth of problems in contemporary American society, Galston
confronts the deep criticism of liberalism from many
quarters by noting the lack of clear liberal civic virtues
and the policy implications of this situation.
The work of these two liberal philosophers will be the
focus of this chapter and will include their dissatisfaction
with contemporary liberal articulations and their responses
to communitarian critiques.

WILL KYMLICKA

Will Kymlicka's introduction clarifies his underlying
perspective on liberalism and community.

He declares his

intent to focus on liberalism's "broader account of the

75

relationship between the individual and society--and, in
particular, of the individual's membership in a community
and a culture. " 156

He attempts to demonstrate through his

argument that "the liberal view is sensitive to the way our
individual lives and shared moral deliberations are related
to, and situated in a shared social context. " 157
Kymlicka maintains that liberal understandings of
community are not necessarily in conflict with the liberal
concern for the individual and the relationship between the
individual and the state.

He makes explicit his

dissatisfaction with the communitarian discussion of
community and culture and also the liberal response (or
absence of) to the collective rights of minority cultures.

The Individual. Choice. and Pluralism
Kymlicka begins his response to critics of liberalism
by summarizing and articulating certain core concerns of
liberal theory related to the individual and community which
have been under communitarian fire.
So we have two preconditions for the fulfillment
of our essential interest in leading a life that
is good. One is that we lead our lives from the
inside, in accordance with our beliefs about what
gives value to life; the other is that we be free
to question those beliefs, to examine them in
light of whatever information and examples and
arguments our culture can provide. Individuals
must therefore have the resources and liberties
156
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needed to live their lives in accordance with
their beliefs about value .... Hence the
traditional concern for civil and personal
liberties. And individuals must have the cultural
conditions conducive to acquiring an awareness of
different views about the good life, and to
acquiring an ability to intelligently examine and
re-examine those views. Hence the equally
traditional liberal concern for education, freedom
of expression, freedom of the press, artistic
freedom, etc. These liberties enable us to judge
what is valuable in life in the only way we can
judge such things--i.e. by exploring different
aspects of our collective cultural heritage. 158
The above account of the political morality of modern
liberalism would not come to most people's minds when
describing liberalism.

More often liberals and critics

would emphasize abstract individualism and skepticism about
the good.

Nevertheless, Kymlicka maintains that the

accepted liberal wisdom has very little basis in the
theories of Mill, and that even Rawls and Dworkin are
frequently misunderstood.

"According to liberalism, since

our most essential interest is in getting these beliefs
right and acting on them, government treats people as
equals, with equal concern and respect, by providing for
each individual the liberties and resources needed to
examine and act on these beliefs.

This requirement forms

the basis of contemporary liberal theories of justice.
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Kymlicka holds that "the importance liberal societies
attach to freedom of expression is explicable, I think, if
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the assumption of plurality is accompanied by the view of
revisability.
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There are theorists who do criticize the

liberal understanding of individual choice devoid of the
concept of revisability 161 •

Among them are Taylor because

it is logically empty and Sandel because it presupposes a
mistaken self-understanding.

Kymlicka holds that this is a

misreading of liberalism.
[T]he concern is that this vaunting of 'free
individuality' will result not in the confident
affirmation and pursuit of worthy courses of
action but rather in existential uncertainty and
anomie, in doubt about the very value of one's
life and its purposes. To put it
melodramatically, the tragedy of the human
situation is that we do indeed think of ourselves
as morally sovereign--we alone can make these
judgements of value, others can't make them for
us. But at the same time, we can't believe in our
judgements unless someone else confirms them for
us. No one's life goes well if led according to
values she's chosen but doesn't really believe in,
and the confirmation of others is needed for firm
belief. 162
Another issue where Kymlicka highlights the arguments
of critics of liberalism is in his discussion of the self
and its interests.

He identifies five communitarian

arguments explaining the inadequacies of the liberal view of
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Kyrnlicka defines revisability as one of
the basic "precondition for the fulfillment of our
essential interests in leading a life that is
good ... that we be free to question those beliefs,
to examine them in light of whatever information
and examples and arguments our culture can
provide. " (Ibid. )
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the self: "(1) it is empty; (2) it violates our selfperceptions; (3) ignores our embeddedness in communal
practices; (4) ignores the necessity for social confirmation
of our individual judgements; and (5) pretends to have an
impossible universality or objectivity. " 163

Communitarian

criticisms of the liberal 'individualistic' pursuit of
interests, according to Kymlicka, holds that "liberal
politics is said to neglect the social preconditions for the
effective fulfillment of those interests. " 164
While ultimately discounting the above communitarian
objections, Kymlicka does recognize the importance of
community in the development of the self and its interests.
This recognition primarily takes the form of cultural
membership.

He maintains that cultural membership is a

matter of circumstances, not shared choice (Waltzer's
position), and that its subsequent standing as a legal issue
is based on the liberal understanding of equality.
"Cultural membership is not a means used in the pursuit of
one's ends.

It is rather the context within which we choose

our ends, and come to see their value, and this is a
precondition of self-respect, of the sense that one's ends
are worth pursuing.

And it affects our very sense of

personal identity and capacity. " 165
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about cultural membership to the liberal concept of
equality, Kymlicka avoids many of the pitfalls found in
understandings of community articulated by critics of
liberalism.
In his discussion of conceptions of the good and the
choice process Kymlicka elaborates on the liberal definition
of individualism.
Liberal individualism is rather an insistence on
respect for each individual's capacity to
understand and evaluate her own actions, to make
judgements about the value of the communal and
cultural circumstances she finds herself in.
Indeed, individuals have not only the capacity but
also the responsibility for making such
judgements; respect for the legitimate claims of
others should enter into the very formation of our
aims and ambitions. Liberal individualism is
grounded in this irreducible commitment to the
role of individual self-direction and
responsibility in a just community, and to the
principle of moral equality which underlies
both . 166
The above is Kymlicka's final verdict on the optimal
circumstances for the pursuit of an individual's conception
of the good, and how liberalism can best accommodate this
understanding.

Community and Cultural Membership
Kymlicka's defense of liberalism relies heavily on his
analysis of the respective theoretical weaknesses and
strengths of two contemporary leaders in the field of
liberal justice: John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin.
166
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identifies a number of features both utilized in their
discussions of equality.

"For both, the interests of each

citizen are given equal consideration in two social
institutions or procedures: an economic market and a
political process of majority government. " 167

He maintains

that "their arguments notice, and indeed emphasize, our
dependence, as individuals, on our cultural structure and
community ....

These liberals do not deny that the free

individual is only possible in a culture of freedom. " 168
Kymlicka notes that the centrality of notions such as
neutrality and tolerance to liberal philosophy and society
are proof they recognize the importance of community.

"Many

liberal philosophers have argued for tolerance because it
provides the best conditions under which people can make
informed and rational judgements about the value of
different pursuits.

Respect for the liberty of others is

predicated not on our inability to criticize preferences,
but precisely on the role of freedom in securing the
conditions under which we can best make such
judgements.
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However, many contemporary liberal

theorists fail to make explicit conditions beyond economic
and political factors necessary for the flourishing of
liberalism.
167
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The liberal belief in the value of neutrality and
pluralism was discussed in Chapter

II

of this thesis.

While

Kymlicka would agree that these tenets are essential to
liberalism, he asserts that the strongest defense of
pluralism is found when pluralism is accompanied by the
revisability of individual ends . 170

This differs from the

defense of pluralism found in the recent work of Rawls and
Larmore, who base their defense of personal liberties on the
plurality of different people's ends.

Their theories

maintain that "[s]o long as different people have differing
ends, then mutual respect requires that the government ought
not to favor one group over another." 171
One aspect of community as the context of choice which
Kymlicka explores is the distinction between political
community and cultural community.

Kymlicka notes that

culturally plural states are the norm in the political
communities of the globe 172 •

This situation presents an

important theoretical challenge to the liberal polity.

He

faults leading liberal theorists such as Dworkin and Rawls
for their silence on the issues of minority cultures in a
world of cultural plurality within political communities.
Kymlicka maintains that this theoretical lacuna leaves
liberalism unprepared to respond to communitarian and
170
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conservative criticisms.
Kymlicka views culture as arising from people's
circumstances, not a matter of choice.

He places his

understanding of minority rights in the equality debate.
Kymlicka holds that the only sound liberal response to the
case of aboriginal rights is based upon an argument of
unequal circumstances, not shared choice.

In the Canadian

context "unlike the dominant French or English cultures, the
very existence of aboriginal cultural communities is
vulnerable to the decisions of the non-aboriginal majority
around them.

They could be outbid or outvoted on resources

crucial to the survival of their communities, a possibility
that members of the majority cultures simply do not
face." 173

English or French cultures in Canada "get for

free what aboriginal people have to pay for: secure cultural
membership.

This is an important inequality, and if it is

ignored, it becomes an important injustice. " 174
Kymlicka's treatise examines issues of justice in
liberal society and theory through the case study of
aboriginal issues.

This policy and theoretical dilemma is

faced by many Western democratic liberal societies.
Kymlicka contrasts and compares the differing challenges
that Canada and the United States have faced with aboriginal
legal issues over the years.
173
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the civil rights movement and the situation of the black
minority in America has radically affected the liberal
debate on minority rights and the meaning of cultural
membership.

The attempt to interpret the constitution and

legal system in a color blind manner to address the needs of
the black American community has prejudiced interpreting the
situation of Native American communities.

While not

advocating the reversal of civil rights legislation and its
positive impact on the black American population, he holds
that Native peoples' cultural membership requires a
different interpretation of liberal understandings of
culture and community.
In fact, it is the situation of Indians, not
blacks, in America which is most relevant for
understanding questions of the protection of
minorities.
It is the special circumstances of
American blacks that are anomalous in the
international arena. Far more of the world's
minorities are in a similar position to American
Indians (i.e. as a stable and geographically
distinct historical community with separate
language and culture rendered a minority by
conquest or immigration or the redrawing of
political boundaries) . 175
The arguments which Kymlicka develops within liberalism
for the theoretical and policy challenges that minority
rights present are persuasive.

However, he is not a lone

theorist in the liberal camp concerned with the
communitarian attack of liberalism.

Liberalism as the

dominant contemporary theory has attracted many fine minds
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to its defense.

William Galston brings a different

perspective to the project which bears highlighting.

WILLIAM A. GALSTON

While responding to both liberal and communitarian
writers, William A. Galston's theoretical stance is firmly
in the liberal camp.

He acknowledges communitarian concerns

about the condition of contemporary moral culture in liberal
society, but maintains that liberalism is not wholly
responsible for this situation.

"Of all the issues facing

contemporary liberal polity, one is of special concern to me
here: the relationship between liberal political
institutions and practices, on the one hand, and what might
be called the moral culture of liberal society on the
other.
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Galston maintains that liberal theory has been unable
to address many of the challenges facing the liberal polity
in modern times, which has exacerbated communal problems
rather than confronting them.

His work aims to address

problems in the political arena by making explicit a number
of philosophical shortcomings of liberalism.
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Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal
State, (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University
Press, 1991), p. 6.
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Galston's theoretical perspective has been grounded in his
activism in American political life.

This experience

contributed to his conclusion that not all problems in
contemporary life can be blamed on theoretical weaknesses,
nor do their solutions lie in the realm of theory alone.

Pluralism and the Good
From its earliest days, the liberal conception of
freedom, which focuses on the individual, has been accused
of causing (or at least contributing to) grave damage to
social unity.

The classical liberal response to this

argument, at least since Locke, is to counter that "civil
strife is the product not of diversity but, rather, of
public institutions designed to repress it.

Acceptance of

diversity will produce, or restore, peace; pluralism is
compatible with social unity; self-determining individuals
will be linked to the accommodating state by bonds of
interest and conviction far stronger than a sullen obedience
born of fear. " 177

Galston asserts that contemporary

liberals have taken this ideal of a tolerant state to an
extreme, which has harmed the body politic.

He holds that

theorists such as Larmore and Rawls place state neutrality
at the core of their liberal doctrines to the detriment of
other liberal values.
Galston believes that this preferential treatment of
177
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neutrality has submerged other equally important liberal
elements.

At the heart of this version of liberalism is a

conception of the good which belies its espoused neutrality.
Liberalism presupposes a conception of individual human
good 178 which Galston believes should be explicit.

Thus he

begins his excavations of a set of human "conditions,
capacities, or functionings, not just internal states of
feeling.
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In brief summary he proposes the following

account as the liberal theory of well-being:
1.

Life is basically good and the taking or premature
cessation of life is bad. 180

2.

Normal humans are endowed with certain basic
capacities: "the senses, various kinds of physical
motion, speech, reason, and sociability, among
others . "181

3.

Humans are "desiring, interest-pursuing, end-seeking,
purposive creatures. 11182

4.

Freedom is an indispensable element of each
individual' s good. 183

178

Galston uses the term human good
interchangeably with well being.
(Ibid, p. 166.)
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5.

Elements of human rationality which are part of a
liberal conception of the good include:
"(1} an understanding of means-ends relations
sufficient to play an active, independent role in
the economy and society;
(2}

each individual's understanding of himself or
herself as similar to others for certain purposes,
that is, as properly governed by general social
rules;

(3}

the ability to respond to rational persuasion (as
opposed simply to force and threats} ; and

(4)

when deliberating publicly in matters requiring
collective action, the disposition to employ
public reasons, open to inspection by others,
whenever possible.

6.

11184

"An important element of our intrinsic good is the
network of significant relations we establish with
others.

The ingredients are familiar: family, friends,

social and work acquaintances, associates in voluntary
organizations, fellow participants in intense
collective endeavors such as politics and military
combat, among others. " 185
7.

"We regard an individual's subjective experience
(pleasure versus pain, fear versus security, and so
184
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185
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forth) as an important element of his or her good ....
Nor does it mean that we regard pleasure accompanying
acts of harm done to others or oneself as good.
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Galston holds that the above account of the good is
sufficiently thin, minimally perfectionist, and open enough,
to accommodate a range of thicker conceptions of the good
while still clarifying what is acceptable human behavior, or
the basis of public action.

In contrast to neutralist

theorists of liberalism, Galston describes its distinctive
qualities:
It is not the absence of an account of the good
that distinguishes liberalism from other forms of
political theory and practice.
It is rather a
special set of reasons for restricting the
movement from the good to public coercion. These
reasons give liberals grounds for refraining from
coercion altogether in some circumstances, for
limiting coercion to the collective provision of
capabilities or opportunities in others, and for
substituting respectful persuasion for coercion
wherever possible.
In this, it is possible to
bring our commonsense understanding of the
individual good, and of the public role in
promoting it, into harmony with the liberal
commitment to diversity and resistance to
tyranny. 187
In the process of making explicit liberal purposes
Galston maintains that the above account is an understanding
of the good seen as opportunity rather than coercive
command.

"It will try to see to it that every adult has
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fair access to the good (or to the means to it), including
the development of inner capacities needed to define and
pursue a decent life, but will typically not try to enforce
its conception on resisters.

It will, however, try to

impart its conception of the good to children and to protect
them from violations of it. " 188

The State and Neutrality
Galston's concern for the public policy implications of
the above liberal account of human well-being is further
developed in his understanding of the relationship between
the individual and community.

He writes that within the

liberal polity distributive debates rely on three kinds of
claims: "those arising from the bare fact of membership in
the community (need) ; those arising from contributions to
community (desert) ; and those arising from the voluntary
individual disposition of resources in areas left
undetermined by the legitimate claims of others
(choice) . " 189
For purposes of this thesis the liberal conception of
choice is of the most interest, and Galston holds that its
theoretical foundation is based on the liberal conception of
the good: "on individual freedom, on the satisfaction of
legitimate interests, and on the broader view that this
188
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conception is partial and limited, and allows for a very
significant range of legitimate diversity.
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This

understanding of choice reveals Galston's commitment (albeit
critical) to liberalism and community.

"Liberalism is an

account of the manner in which diverse moral communities can
coexist within a single legal community" 191

Liberal

reliance on procedural justice does not negate moral
diversity, but rather prescinds it, anticipating that the
inevitable conflict which arises within a pluralist society
can be solved through just procedures in the broader
political community.
Galston asserts that the liberal presumption of state
neutrality on moral matters, i.e. conceptions of the good,
is not neutral in at least three senses:
The first, just discussed, is the explicit
preference given to civil considerations whenever
religious practices come into conflict with them.
The second is the implicit tilt toward religions
characterized more by internal faith than by
external observance - or, to put it the other way
around, against religions in which piety is
centrally expressed through obedience to a system
of law, as in Orthodox Judaism and Islam.
Finally, as suggested earlier, in our discussion
of Rawls's "common-sense sociology," the Lockean
distinction between faith and observance tends to
screen out forms of religion whose viability
depends on state mechanisms or endorsement. 192
Galston's discussion of community draws on liberal
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sources and communitarian insights.

The classical liberal

account of toleration was based on the recognition that in
political communities only some meanings are shared and
others are not.

Galston defines his rendition of liberal

virtues understood instrumentally (for the preservation of
liberal society and institutions) where the liberal polity
is "possessing to a high degree the following features:
popular-constitutional government; a diverse society with a
wide range of individual opportunities and choices; a
predominately market economy; and a substantial strongly
protected sphere of privacy and individual rights.
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At the center of Galston's liberal purposes is the
belief in a core of virtues which liberals need to make
explicit in order to respond to its critics.

Without

clarifying these virtues there are a number of dangers posed
to the liberal polity: the tendency to overemphasize
neutrality, which poses particular hazards; the inability to
respond coherently to critics of liberalism, specifically
those such as Macintyre who focus on the need for communal
virtues; the liberal polity cannot begin to create,
maintain, and educate citizens about the essential virtues
necessary for the survival of its institutions, thus
weakening the bonds of consensus necessary for its
continuation.
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Liberal Virtues
Galston is interested in stimulating a dialogue about
the catalog of liberal virtues.

He begins by maintaining

that there are three virtues which are requisite of any
political community: courage, law-abidingness, and
loyalty . 194

Additionally, there are three virtues of

liberal politics.
1.

Virtues of citizenship: respect for the rights of
others, the capacity to discern the talent and
character of candidates and elected officials, and
moderation and self-disciplined in demands, not simply
self-interested in political outcomes.

2.

Virtues of leadership: patience and pragmatism to work
within the constraints of social diversity and
constitutional institutions, "capacity to forge a sense
of common purposes against the centrifugal tendencies
of an individualistic and fragmented society, " 195 and
tempering the desire for reelection with responsible
public policy.

3.

General political virtues: the commitment to open
dialogue about divisive issues, resolving disputes
through persuasion rather than manipulation or the use
of force, and "the disposition to narrow the gap
(insofar as it is in one's power) between principles
194

Ibid, p. 221.

195

Ibid, p. 226.
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and practices in liberal society. " 196
Beyond these universal individual attributes liberal

society has two salient features, individualism and
diversity.

These features are characterized by

individualism balanced with the virtue of family solidarity
and diversity maintained through the virtue of
tolerance. 197

There are two types of virtues which Galston

holds are essential to the liberal economy:
those required by different economic roles and
those required by liberal economic life as a
whole. In a modern market economy, the basic
roles are those of the entrepreneur and the
organization employee. The entrepreneurial
virtues form a familiar litany: imagination,
initiative, drive, determination. The
organizational virtues are very different from
(and in some respects the reverse of) the
entrepreneurial. They include traits such as
punctuality, reliability, civility towards coworkers, and a willingness to work within
established frameworks and tasks. 198
Galston lists three virtues of the general modern liberal
economy: the work ethic, a capacity for moderate delay of
gratification, and adaptability. 199
The above index of instrumental liberal virtues Galston
proposes as "empirical hypotheses about connections between
individual character and social institutions.
196

Ibid, p. 227.

197

Ibid, p. 222.
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with his account of the liberal conception of the good, one
has a broader perspective on how he understands liberal
virtues which contribute to his underlying motivation of
improving public policy in the liberal polity.

CONCLUSION

The work of Kymlicka and Galston borrows vocabulary
from both liberals and communitarians, and shares their
respective concerns for individualism and community.

Both

scholars have grounded their theoretical inquiries in real
policy issues facing liberal polities and challenging
communities.

While neither claims to propose grand

solutions to deep problems, both believe that liberal theory
has to admit its theoretical shortcomings.

Another common

denominator in the work of these philosophers is that they
agree that the eminence of individualism in liberalism has
often ignored liberal presuppositions about healthy
community and the meaning of cultural membership.
The work of Kymlicka and Galston is much more closely
grounded in the specific problems of liberal society and the
public policy challenges than many in the contemporary
liberal camp, as well as many critics of liberalism.
Finally, both Kymlicka and Galston share an approach to
community as a context of choice.

Their theories recognize
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cultural factors in the process of choosing conceptions of
the good.

Kymlicka does this explicitly and Galston

implicitly.

It is for that reason that I chose to focus on

these two liberal thinkers, for they have elicited the
needed vocabulary and articulated a framework within
liberalism in order to build a more meaningful understanding
of community.

However, there are also a number of salient

differences between Kymlicka and Galston.

The final chapter

of this thesis will attempt to explore more fully these
differences, the effectiveness of their response to the
communitarian critique and the success of their project to
reinterpret liberal theory.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
"Socialization processes shape the members of the
system into subjects capable of speaking and
acting. The embryo enters this formative process,
and the individual is not released from it until
his death. 11201
Jurgen Habermas
Legitimation Crisis

This thesis began by posing a number of questions about
how leading liberal and non-liberal theorists conceptualize
the relationship between the individual and his/her
community.

Subsequent chapters summarized and contrasted

what various contemporary philosophers have written on the
subject.

Chapters two and three examined the works of

notable theorists, from the liberal camp (John Rawls and
Richard Flathman) and from the critics of liberalism
(Alasdair Macintyre, Benjamin Barber, Charles Taylor,
Michael Sandel and the authors of Habits of the Heart).
Liberalism, as espoused by Rawls, Flathman and others,
has a number of shortcomings with regard to the relationship
between the individual and community.

A number of these

were identified by the critics of liberalism analyzed in

Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis,
trans. Thomas McCarthy (Beacon Press: Boston,
1975) / p. 9.
201
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chapter three.

First, the deontological social contract

rendition of liberalism was identified as problematic for
placing the choice of principles of justice in a vacuum free
of traditions, relationships, and circumstances.

Second,

concern about community and social, economic, environmental,
political, and legal challenges facing American society is a
common motive.

Many critics feel that liberals have not

dealt with the atomistic side of contemporary modern liberal
societies.

Third, these critical voices unite in

identifying the inadequacy of the liberal portrait of the
disengaged self.

Whether it is Macintyre's narrative self,

or Sandel's embedded self, they all plead to widen the
liberal ontology (or to completely replace it),
incorporating factors beyond the narrow confines of the
atomistic disengaged self.
Many of these critics are dissatisfied with liberal
theory's understanding of the relationship between the
individual and community and believe that this omission has
harmed theory and, some even maintain, human collective
identities.

While many of the critical voices encountered

in this thesis were eloquent and identified weak points in
liberal theory, those same critics have failed to provide
coherent alternatives to liberalism which outline
theoretical guidelines for the application of principles of
justice and protection of the rights of the individual.
The fourth chapter examined the work of Will Kymlicka
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and William Galston.

These two theorist from within the

liberal tradition have based their theoretical work on
policy challenges facing contemporary liberal polities.
Their voices combine the focus of communal needs and issues
of identity with the theoretical strengths of liberalism.
In Kymlicka's Liberalism, Community, and Culture he
uses the challenge which minority rights have presented to
liberal conceptions of justice to argue that liberal
traditions can be drawn upon for a coherent recognition of
culture as an essential right of the individual.

Kymlicka

bases his argument for expanding liberal understandings of
minority rights on liberalism's commitment to equality of
circumstances; viewing culture as a potential source of
inequality which the dominant culture takes for granted,
while minority cultures must struggle to maintain cultural
integrity.

Galston's Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and

Diversity in the Liberal State focuses on "the relationship
between liberal political institutions and practices, on the
one hand, and what might be called the moral culture of
liberal society on the other.

11202

Galston attempts to

uncover a liberal conception of the good and begin a
dialogue of liberal virtues for purposes of civic education.
While Kymlicka and Galston both address recent
criticisms of liberalism with regard to community and they
share a number of theoretical commitments, there are also
202

Galston, p. 6.
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many differences in their work.

This final chapter will

note some of these differences and argue that Kymlicka's
theoretical contributions best respond to the justified (in
the opinion of this thesis) criticisms of liberal theory
vis-a-vis issues of community.

KYMLICKA AND GALSTON

On the Ontological Level
Both Kymlicka and Galston remain committed to the core
ontological understandings of traditional liberal theory, as
stated by Ackerman (page 4 of this thesis) .

It holds that

"human beings are purposive, goal-seeking creatures whose
actions and patterns of action cannot be understood apart
from their conceptions of the good."

In harmony with

communitarian insights, Kymlicka expands this basic
definition to include cultural membership as an essential
feature of human rationality.

He points out that within the

liberal moral ontology there has been no room for
recognition of collective rights.

This lacuna has had dire

consequences for liberal moral and legal theory.
Kymlicka's argument for the recognition of cultural
membership as a legitimate claim to equal treatment is
centered on his understanding that political communities in
most modern manifestations contain diverse cultural
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communities.

This simple fact is often ignored in liberal

theory and Kymlicka claims that this omission is why
cultural membership is not recognized as a source of
inequality. 203

Most liberals would justify this omission

based on the following reason.
Once individuals have been treated as equals, with
the respect and concern owed them as moral beings,
there is no further obligation to treat the
communities to which they belong as equals. The
community has no moral existence or claims of its
own.
It is not that community is unimportant to
the liberal, but simply that it is important for
what it contributes to the lives of individuals.
Individuals and collective rights cannot compete
for the same moral space, in liberal theory, since
the value of the collective derives from its
contribution to the value of individual lives. 204
I believe that Kymlicka would include Galston in the
same category with Rawls and Dworkin who he claims ignore
the reality of minority cultures in contemporary liberal
societies.

These theorists do not deny the pluralist nature

of contemporary society, but they state that the source of
this diversity is not due to circumstances.
the result of choice.

Rather, it is

Galston holds that modern liberal-

democratic societies are "characterized by an irreversible
pluralism, that is, by conflicting and incommensurable
conceptions of the human good.

11205

It is clear that the

diversity which Galston is referring to is generated by

203

Kymlicka, p. 178.
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Ibid, p. 141.
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Galston, p. 140.
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differing conceptions of the good, not Kymlicka's cultural
communities whose patterns of interaction and traditions
provide the framework within which the individual navigates.
Thus, it would appear that Galston's ontology excludes
cultural factors as a source of diversity.

Without this

explicit recognition, I do not believe his ontology is
expanded in the way that Kymlicka argues for.

While

Galston recognizes a type of liberal "culture" by
articulating liberal values, he maintains that it is still
part of the choice of a liberal conception of the good.
Kymlicka is concerned with the inequality of circumstances
of cultures, dominant (i.e. liberal) versus minority
cultures.
Galston envisions a diverse society, and the role of
the state, where individuals begin with the same cultural
frame of reference and freely chose their conceptions of the
good.

Conditions of self-respect rooted in culture are a

constant in his understanding.

This contrasts to Kymlicka's

definition of the cultural pluralism found in most modern
political communities and the unequal nature of their
relationship.

Galston's subsequent argument against the

neutral state, as conceived by a number of contemporary
theorists, is based upon his understanding of the meaning of
pluralism.
I find Kymlicka's understanding of pluralism of
community far more convincing than conventional liberal
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renditions of moral diversity.

Kymlicka makes an important

distinction between political and cultural communities, as
respectively being the structures of a modern state, with a
government and shared legal system206 and the cultural
structure in a community as the context of choice for lifeplans allowing us to judge for ourselves the value of our
choices 207 •

Kymlicka's definition of diverse cultural

communities does not negate the value of Galston's
observations on moral diversity.

Rather it explores a

further dimension of pluralism.
Kymlicka's conception of plural cultural communities is
a theoretical strength reinforced by an increasing
understanding that the types of choices an individual within
an indigenous community in Canada or the U.S. would make are
not made in a cultural vacuum or behind a Rawlsian "veil of
ignorance".

Self-respect is an essential feature of the

choice process of one's conception of the good 208 •

The

cultural framework one inherits is interwoven with one's
self-respect.

Moreover, Kymlicka makes the argument, based

on research among indigenous communities in North America,

206

Kymlicka, p. 135.

201

Particular cultural communities are not
frozen in time, but continue "to exist even when
its members are free to modify the character of
the culture, should they find its traditional ways
of life no longer worth while." (Ibid, p. 166-7.)
208

Rawls terms self-respect the most
important primary good. (Rawls, p. 440.)
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that "cultural membership seems crucial to personal agency
and development: when the individual is stripped of her
cultural heritage, her development becomes stunted.

11209

Kymlicka does not see one's cultural membership as a means
used to pursue one's ends.

"It is rather the context within

which we choose our ends, and come to see their value, and
that is a precondition of self-respect, of the sense that
one' s ends are worth pursuing. " 210
Kymlicka has done a fine job of incorporating
communitarian insights about the situatedness and
embeddedness of the individual into liberal theory.

By

developing the idea of cultural membership and viewing
community as a context of choice, I believe that Kymlicka
has deeply affected the course of future liberal theory.

At

the ontological level, his expansion of the liberal view of
what it is to be a human is first rate.

Conflict
In its history liberal theory has not shied away from
issues of conflict.

In fact it could be argued that

liberalism's recognition of the inevitability of
conflict 211 has been a distinguishing feature.
209

Kymlicka, p. 176.

210

Ibid, p. 192.

211

However,

Ackerman's tenets of liberalism 4-6
clarify the role of conflict. (See pages 4 and 5
of this thesis.)
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these discussions of conflict have demonstrated considerable
diversity in how to minimize, or contain, the inevitable
conflicts that arise.

There are a number of types of

conflict which liberalism is concerned with and which
Galston and Kymlicka approach differently: conflict between
moral or cultural communities within one political
community, conflict between the state and sub-communities
and conflict between the state and the individual.
Kymlicka's work deals directly with the issue of
conflict between minority and dominant cultural communities
within the larger political community.

His commitment to

community as the context of choice holds that the state in
refereeing such conflicts through the legal process must
recognize the disadvantages which minority cultures function
under as a source of inequality.

Ultimately, Kymlicka holds

that liberal accounts of justice must accord a role for
cultural membership.
This account of justice translated into policy in the
liberal polity holds that cultural membership is essential
for the principles of equality and tolerance.

His argument

hinges on the conception of human social needs which says
that "it's only through having a rich and secure cultural
structure that people can become aware, in a vivid way, of
the options available to them, and intelligently examine
their value.

Without such a cultural structure, children

and adolescents lack adequate role-models, which leads to
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despondency and escapism. " 212

This position contrasts to

Galston's which preferences the dominant liberal values when
the state plays an arbitration role.
In conflict which arises between the state and a
minority community, Kymlicka would maintain that in the
interest of justice the state needs to recognize the
cultural integrity of that minority culture.

If not

expressly destructive to the larger political community, the
minority community should be allowed to make its own
decisions.

Galston, however, sides in this conflict with

the principle of the larger community.

For example, if a

minority community desires to withdraw in order to preserve
their culture, his response is that "as long as your group
remains located within the domain of wider community, it
necessarily interacts with and affects that community in
many ways .... It is not clear that the political community
could afford to remain indifferent to the example you might
set for other potential withdrawers.

11213

I believe that

Kymlicka would respond to the specific instance of
withdrawal or isolation of a particular cultural community
based upon cultural circumstances.

For instance, if a

separatist supremist group sought withdrawal, I believe he
would see that as a choice of a particular conception of the
good.

However, Kymlicka is concerned about the instance
212

Kymlicka, p. 165.

213

Galston, p. 251.
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where an indigenous culture's status as a minority did not
occur by choice.

In his expanded liberal project, he might

recognize their claim for withdrawal, or at the least to
have a type of insurance against intrusion by the dominant
culture.
At the level of conflict between the individual and the
state, Galston and Kymlicka again diverge.

The state has

the authority to ensure that the core of liberal virtues
which Galston outlines is guaranteed.

"In cases of

conflict, this civic core takes priority over individual or
group commitments (even the demands of conscience), and the
state may legitimately use coercive mechanisms to enforce
this priority.

11214

Galston maintains that without proper attention to
liberal values, liberalism is headed for serious problems.
He states at the beginning of his book:

"My guiding

intuition is that the United States is in trouble because it
has failed to attend to the dependence of sound politics on
sound culture, and that all similarly inattentive liberal
polities will eventually experience similar
difficulties. " 215

This insight of Galston' s is reflective

of his emphasis on political communities as the primary
aggregate level, and his ignoring the diverse cultural
communities within the liberal polity.
214
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political perception of the collective level of human
interaction does not address the communitarian critics of
liberalism which understand human rationality and choice
processes as situated and embedded at deep levels in
communities.

Choice
A salient strength of Kymlicka's work is that his
protection of cultural communities is premised on the needs
of the individual.

His argument for considering cultural

circumstances as a background feature of the choice process,
as a context of choice, avoids many theoretical pitfalls
which communitarians, and others critical of liberalism, are
unable to avoid.

Too often theorists in the communitarian

camp want to give a particular version of community as the
ultimate definition.

Other theorists deconstruct

liberalism, yet provide no meaningful conception of justice
or society to replace it.

For liberals, culture too often

is but one choice that the individual will make in his/her
life.

I think that Kymlicka rectifies liberal sins of

omission, while at the same time avoiding communitarian
pitfalls.
At the level of individual choice, I concur with an
account of justice and knowledge such as Benjamin Barber
presents which recognizes that uncertainty is part of the
human experience.

Barber writes that "where life means
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constant motion and change is the only certainty" 216 •

This

leaves the individual choice process of meaningful life
decisions plagued with doubt.

However, many philosophers,

from liberal to communitarian, place the choice process
within a context of certainty.

This certainty is arrived at

variously, yet it accomplishes the same result: a
circumstance where only one choice is plausible.
Rawls's focus on justice as fairness contributes
eloquently to the philosophical traditions of the social
contract, procedural justice, and legal jurisprudence.
However, his elaborate edifice of intersubjectivity is of
little value in the contemplation of real choices, since he
has guaranteed the selection of his principles of justice by
the world he created in his 500 pages.

It is surprising to

think that the creatures in his theory would not chose his
principles!

Behind the veil of ignorance are human beings

who contribute little to the discussion of human capacity of
choice, and the context of choice, in the artificial
original position, bears no relevance to my discussion of
community as the context of choice.
A critic of liberalism, Michael Walzer, paints a very
compelling portrait of "real" community and how justice
would work if we all inhabited the world found in his
Spheres of Justice.

He demonstrates a sincere concern for

injustice, and one respects his aversion to coercion.
216

Barber, p . 2 O .
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is at stake is the ability of the group of people to
dominate their fellows.

It's not the fact that there are

rich and poor that generates egalitarian politics but the
fact that the rich 'grind the faces of the poor,' impose
their poverty upon them, command their deferential
behavior.

11211

While Walzer' s spheres of justice sound like

a great place to live, he, like Rawls, places the choice
process in a vacuum.

11

My purpose in this book is to

describe a society where no social good serves or can serve
as a means of domination.

I won't try to describe how we

might go about creating such a society. 11210

This statement

hedges the issue of how moral, ethical and meaningful life
decisions occur in our lives, and communities.

CONCLUSION

Kymlicka and Galston share features, but their
renovation projects have very different objectives and
starting points.

While they both view community as a

context of choice, Kymlicka's project attempts to rectify
unequal/unjust legal treatment of minority rights.
Galston's intent in articulating liberal virtues is to
incorporate them into civic education.
217
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Both Kymlicka and Galston focus on practical policy
challenges found in the contemporary liberal polity, as well
as confront thorny theoretical issues.

The public policy

issue Kymlicka uses to illustrate and expand his theory is
minority rights in North America.

His theoretical challenge

is to expand the liberal enterprise to justly address this
policy dilemma.

Galston's theoretical challenge is to

articulate liberal virtues which recent versions of the
neutral state are reluctant to make explicit.

His policy

concern is that civic education219 be instituted which
reflect these clarified liberal virtues.
Kymlicka states that he sees a political reason for
expanding liberal theory to include a conception of cultural
membership.

"In a political or legal conflict between

minority rights and liberal equality, liberalism may lose
out.

11220

Galston believes that if civic education

incorporated his liberal virtues, conflict would be
minimized.

By not socializing civic liberal values there

are a number of dangers.

The foremost threat "to children

in modern liberal societies is not that they will believe in
something too deeply, but that they will believe in nothing

219

Galston defines the purpose of civic
education to form citizens "who effectively
conduct their lives within, and support, their
political communities." (p. 243)
220
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very deeply at all.

11221

It appears to me that too much of Galston's theory
requires recreating society.

His project to articulate

liberal purposes is not limited to the theoretical realm, in
fact it requires that these liberal virtues then become part
of the socialization process through a variety of mechanisms
including the education system.

Kymlicka's suggestions for

expansion of the liberal enterprise is limited to the realm
of legal jurisprudence which could easily accommodate his
theoretical understandings.

To reiterate this point,

Galston's and Kymlicka's projects are very different in
scope.

Galston uses the pages of theory to describe how to

change society, while Kymlicka hopes to impact his political
community by expanding the role of culture in liberal legal
theory.

Galston's attempt to make explicit liberal virtues

is convincing.

However, I believe his idea on how to

socialize such values is often weak and not spelled out
clearly.
I find Kymlicka's argument for using the case of
minority rights to expand liberalism's boundaries persuasive
- an important plank on which to construct a more stable
liberal structure responsive to the challenges of the
polity.

I will repeat a quotation by Kymlicka used in the

previous chapter to reiterate the value of culture and
community as a context of choice.
221
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I think that because this
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recognition is absent in so much of contemporary philosophy
- from Waltzer to Rawls - the health of liberal institutions
of the modern state is affected.

It is "[o]nly through

having a rich and secure cultural structure that people can
become aware, in a vivid way, of the options available to
them, and intelligently examine their value.

Without such a

cultural structure, children and adolescents lack adequate
role-models, which leads to despondency and escapism.

11222

In conclusion I would like to use the words of a
prominent liberal theorist, Ronald Dworkin, who writes in
his book A Matter of Principle that the role of theory is
that of a critic, not a mirror:
[i]t is part of our common political life, if
anything is, that justice is our critic not our
mirror, that any decision about the distribution
of any good--wealth, welfare, honors, education,
recognition, office--may be reopened, no matter
how firm the traditions that are then challenged,
that we may always ask of some settled
institutional scheme whether it is fair. 223
Reopening the debate on community within the liberal
tradition is an opportunity to meet the challenge presented
by social conditions, as well as that presented by critics
of liberalism.

I believe that by heeding Kymlicka's

suggestion to expand liberal theory to encompass cultural
membership, and viewing community as a context of choice,

222
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Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle,
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1985), p. 219.
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theory and the modern liberal polity we live in will be
improved.

I

believe that despite theoretical shortcomings,

the liberal enterprise is still alive and healthy.

One of

its strengths continues to be the quality of theorists, such
as Kymlicka, who are attracted to its strengths, yet who
ever seek to improve its insights.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Arendt, Hannah.
on Violence. New York: Harcourt, Brace &
World, Inc., 1969.
Barber, Benjamin.
The Conquest of
Philosophy in Democratic Times.
Princeton University Press, 1988.

Poli~ics:

Princeton,

Liberal
N.J.:

Bellah, Robert N.; Madsen, Richard; Sullivan, William M.;
Swidler, Ann; Tipton, Steven M.
Habits of the
Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American
Life.
Berkeley,
California:
University
of
California Press, 1985.
Bellah, Robert N.; Madsen, Richard; Sullivan, William M.;
Swidler, Ann; Tipton, Steven M.
Individualism &
commitment in American Life: Readings on the Themes
of Habits of the Heart.
New York: Harper & Row,
Publishers, 1987.
Berry, Wendell. The Unsettling of American
Agriculture. New York, NY: Avon, 1977.
Cornford, Francis MacDonald.
Translated & Introduced.
Press, 1945.

Culture

&

The Republic of Plato.
Oxford: Oxford University

Capra, Fritjof. The Turning Point: Science, Society, and the
Rising Culture. New York: Bantam Books, 1982.
Damico, Alfonso, J., ed. Liberals on Liberalism.
Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield, 1986.
Devlin, Patrick. The Enforcement of Morals.
Oxford University Press, 1965.

Totowa, New

Oxford, England:

Delattre, Roland A. "The Culture of Procurement: Reflectsion
on Addiction and the Dynamics of American Culture" in
Community in America: The Challenge of Habits of the
Heart. Edited & introduced by Reynolds, Charles H., and
Norman, Ralph v .. Berkeley, California: University of
California Press, 1988.
de Tocqueville, Alexis. Democracy in America. Edited by J.P.
Mayer.
Translated by George Lawrence.
Garden
City, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company,
Inc., 1969.
Donagan, Alan. The Theory of Morality.
of Chicago Press, 1977.

Chicago: University

Durkh_eim, Emile. The Division of Labor in Society. Translated
by W.D. Halls. Introduced by Lewis A. easer. New York:
The Free Press. 1984.
Emile.
The Rules of Sociological Method, and
Selected Texts on Sociology and its Method. Edited and

Durkheim,

Introduced by Steven Lukes. Translated by W.D. Halls.
New York: The Free Press, 1982.

Durkheim, Emile. Moral Education: A Study in the Theory and
Application

of

the

Sociology

of

Education.

Foreward by Paul Fauconnet. Translated by Everett
K. Wilson and Herman Schnurer.
Edited and
Introduced by Everett K. Wilson.
New York: The
Free Press, 1961.
Dworkin, Ronald. "Liberalism." Liberalism and Its Critics.
Edited by Michael Sandel. New York: New York University
Press, 1984.
Dworkin, Ronald.
A Matter of Principle. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985.
Eastman, Arthur M., ed. et al. The Norton Reader: An Anthology
of Expository Prose. 8th ed. New York: W.W. Norton & co.,
Inc., 1965.
Elgin, Duane.
"Rethinking TV: TV + Telephone = Electronic
Democracy." Utne Reader. No.40, July/Aug. 1990,
p. 70-2.
Eisler, Riane.
The Chalice and the Blade: Our History Our
Future. San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1987.
Fay,

Brian.
Critical Social Science; Liberation and its
Limits. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1987.

Flathman, Richard E. Towards a Liberalism.
Cornell University Press, 1989.

Ithaca, New York:

Foucault, Michel. Discipline & Punishment: The Birth of the
Prison. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage Books,
1979.
French, Marilyn. Beyond Power: on Women, Men and Morals. New
York: Ballantine Books, 1985.
Galston, William A.
"Liberalism and Public Morality."
Liberals on Liberalism. Editor Damico, Alfonso, J.
Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield, 1986.
Galston, William A.
Diversity

in

Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and
the Liberal state.
Cambridge, U.K.:

Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Gill, Emily R.
Self" in

"Goods, Virtues, and the Constitution of the
Damico, Alfonso, J.,
ed.
Liberals on
Liberalism. Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield,
1986.

s.

Greenberg, Martin

and Ruback, R. Barry. After the Crime:
New York: Plenum Press, 1992.

Victim Decision Making.

Friendly Fascism: The New Face of Power in

Gross, Bertram.

America.

New York: M.Evans and Company Inc., 1980.

Gurr, Ted Robert. "Historical Trends in Violent Crime: Europe
and the United States."
In Violence in America: The
History of Crime, Vol. 1. Newbury Park, CA, 1989.
Habermas, Jurgen. Legitimation Crisis. Translated by Thomas
McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press, 1975.
Hart,

H.L.A .• Law,
Liberty, and Morality.
California: Stanford University Press, 1963.

Stanford,

Hoffman, Piotr.
Violence in Modern Philosophy. Chicago,
Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 1989.
Itard, Jean-Marc Gaspard.

"The Wild Boy of Aveyron."

In

Wolf Children and the Problem of Human Nature, by
Lucien Malson.
1972.

New York:

Monthly Review Press,

Jaworski, Leon. "The United States Faces Today a Serious
Threat to Her Continued Existence as a Free People."
Morality and the Law. ed. Robert Baird and Stuart E.
Rosenbaum. Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1988.
Kaufmann,

Walter.

Antichrist.

Nietzsche:

Philosopher,

Psychologist,

4th ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

Press, 1974.
Kuhn, Thomas s. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
Edition, Enlarged. Chicago, University of Chicago
Press, 1970.
Kukathas,
Chandran.
"Are
Political Theory. Vol.
105-139.

2nd

There Any Cultural Rights. "
20, No. 1, (February 1992): p.

Kymlicka, Will. Liberalism, Community and Culture.
UK: Clarendon Press, 1991.

Oxford,

Kymlicka, Will.
"The Rights of Minority Cultures: Reply to
Kukathas." Political Theory. Vol. 20, No. 1, (February
1992): p. 140-146.

Larmore, Charles E. Patterns of Moral Complexity. Columbia
University, New York: Cambridge University Press,
1987.
Lasch,
Christopher.
"The Communitarian Critique of
Liberalism."
Community in America: The Challenge of
Habits of the Heart. Edited and introduced by Reynolds,
Charles, H. and Norman, Ralph v .. Berkeley, California:
University of California Press, 1988.
Lorenz, Konrad. On Aggression. trans. Marjorie Kerr Wilson.
New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1966.
Lyons, David.
Ethics and the rule of law.
University Press: Cambridge, England, 1984.

Cambridge

Macintyre, Alasdair. A Short History of Ethics.
NY: Macmillan Publishing co., Inc., 1966.

New York,

Macintyre, Alasdair. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory.
Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1981.
Macintyre, Alasdair. Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Notre
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press,
1988.
Marcuse, Herbert.
One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the
Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. Boston: Beacon
Press, 1964.
Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty. Edited by Alburey Castell.
Arlington Heights, Illinois: Harlan Davidson, Inc.,
1947.
Miller, Maryann. Coping with Weapons and Violence in Your
School and on Your Streets.
New York: The Rosen
Publishing Group, Inc., 1993.
Montesquieu. The Spirit of the Laws. Translated & Edited by
Anne M. Cobler, Basia Carolyn Miller, Harold Samuel
Stone. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil. Translated by
Walter Kaufman. New York: Vintage Books, 1989.
Neitzsche, Friedrich. On the Genealogy of Morals. Translated
& Edited by Walter Kaufmann.
New York: Vintage Books,
1969.
Neitzsche, Friedrich.
The Will To Power.
Translated by
Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale. Edited by Walter
Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 1968.

Neitzsche, Friedrich. Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Translated by
Walter Kaufmann. New York: Viking, 1966.
Orwell, George.
1984. 10th ed. New York: The New American
Library, Inc, 1981.
Piaget, Jean. The Moral Judgement of the Child. Translated
by Marjorie Gabain. New York: The Free Press, 1965.
Plato. The Republic of Plato. Translated with introduction
and notes by Francis MacDonald Cornford. London: Oxford
University Press, 1941.
Raz,

Joseph.
The Morality of Freedom.
Clarendon Press, 1986.

Oxford,

England:

Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice.
Cambridge, Mass.:
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971.

The

Charles H. , and Norman, Ralph V.
Community in
America: The Challenge of Habits of the Heart. Berkeley,

Reynolds,

California: University of California Press, 1988.
Sandel, Michael J.
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
Sandel, Michael J., Editor. Liberalism and Its Critics.
York: New York University Press, 1984.

New

"Hegel: History and Politics," in Liberalism
New York: New
York University Press, 1984.

Taylor, Charles.

and its Critics, edited by Michael Sandel.

Taylor, Charles. "Rationality," in Rationality and Relativism,
edited by Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes. 4th ed.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1989.
Taylor,

Sources of the Self: The Making of the
Identity.
Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard

Charles.

Modern

University Press, 1989.
Walzer, Michael.

and Equality.

Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism
New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1983.

Max.
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism. Translated by Talcott Parsons. Introduction

Weber,

by Anthony Giddens.

London: Unwin Hyman, Ltd., 1930.

Weber, Max. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization.
Translated by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons.
Edited & introduction by Talcott Parsons.
New
York: The Free Press, 1947.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. English
text of the 3rd ed. Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. New
York: Macmillan Publishing Co.,Inc., 1989.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig.
On Certainty.
Edited by G.E.M.
Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, Translator by Denis Paul
and G.E.M. Anscombe. New York: Harper & Row, 1972.
Wolff, Robert Paul. The Poverty of Liberalism.
Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 1968.
Wolgast, Elizabeth H. The Grammar of Justice.
York: Cornell University Press, 1987.

Boston,

Ithaca, New

Yack, Bernard.
"Liberalism and its Communitarian Critics:
Does Liberal Practice 'Live Down' to Liberal Theory."
Community in America: The Challenge of Habits of the
Heart. Edited and introduced by Reynolds, Charles, H. and
Norman, Ralph v.. Berkeley, California: University of
California Press, 1988.

